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I.  Introduction 
 
Ironically, the study globalization’s impact on the performance of labor markets 
and labor market regulation has generated a new industry that has provided work to a 
small army of researchers for more than a decade.1  So it was with some trepidation that I 
decided to join their ranks, even if only for a short tour of duty, especially in light of the 
sharply contested positions held among these scholars who are drawn from a variety of 
disciplines and come with sharply divergent normative commitments.   
From the beginning of the free-trade era2 one contentious area has been the 
impact of trade liberalization on labor law.  Opponents of NAFTA (and some supporters) 
predicted a regulatory race to the bottom (RTB) would ensue leading to increasingly 
deregulated labor markets.  The result would be weaker collective bargaining laws, lower 
minimum standards, and a decline in the social wage.  In recent years a number of 
scholars have examined the question in light of more than fifteen years experience under 
CUFTA and ten under NAFTA and there seems to be a growing consensus that, contrary 
                                                 
1   A crude indicator of the growth of this industry can be gleaned from searches I 
conducted on two electronic indexes (ASAP Academic – an interdisciplinary index - and the Index 
to Legal Periodicals and Books) of the term “globalization and labo*r.  From the beginning of 
1980 (when both indexes begin) to the end of 1989 there were 4 (1+3) such references.  From 
1990 to December 6, 2004 there were 1484 (508+986).  I will leave it to economically inclined 
readers to decide whether the shift of resources into the globalization research industry has 
increased aggregate welfare. 
2 For the purposes of this paper, the free-trade era begins with the Canada-United States 
Free Trade Agreement (entered into force 1 January 1989) (CUFTA), incorporated into the North 
American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government of Mexico 
and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, I.L.M. 289 
(entered into force 1 January 1994)(NAFTA).  Hereinafter I will just refer to NAFTA unless 
CUFTA is being discussed separately.   
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to those ‘great expectations’, labor laws in North America have not been significantly 
weakened.3   
In this article, I re-examine the effects of NAFTA on collective bargaining law in 
Canada and the United States.  The restriction of my focus to collective bargaining is 
prudential.  In principle a proper assessment of NAFTA’s effects should encompass all 
the strands of labor market regulation, but that is too large a project for an article.  The 
decision to exclude Mexico from this analysis was partly prudential, but also based on the 
fact that its legal traditions, labor market organizations and institutional arrangements are 
very different from those prevailing in Canada and the United States, complicating the 
comparison.   
My contribution to the debates comes down to two points.  On the one hand, I 
argue that the emerging consensus understates the impact of NAFTA-style trade 
liberalization on the legal regulation of collective bargaining because its focus is 
artificially narrow.  In reaching their conclusions, ‘new consensus’ scholars have looked 
exclusively at changes in private sector collective bargaining legislation.  I argue this 
produces a misleading picture of the impact of trade liberalization because it omits public 
                                                 
3 For a review of the literature, see Kevin Banks, “Globalization and Labour Standards – 
Second Look at the Evidence,” (2004) 29 Queen’s Law Journal 533 (Banks challenges emerging 
consensus that globalization has no negative impact on labor standards).  Also see Michel 
Gauvin, Labour Legislation in Canada: Major Developments and Trends, 1989-2003 (Ottawa: 
Labour Law Analysis, Strategic Policy and International Labour Affairs, Labour Program, 
Human Resources and Development Canada, October 3, 2003); Parbudyal Singh, “NAFTA and 
Labor: A Canadian Perspective,” (2002) Journal of Labor Research 433 (short review of changes 
in Canadian labor laws and standards largely based on secondary sources from the mid-1990s); 
Pierre Verge, “How Does Canadian Labour Law Fare in a Global Economy?,” (2000) 42 Journal 
of Industrial Relations 275. 
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sector collective bargaining and, even more importantly, it fails to consider the impact of 
trade liberalization on the effectiveness of statutory collective bargaining schemes.  If the 
focus is broadened to include public sector bargaining and labor law’s effectiveness, then 
one finds there has been more labor market deregulation than consensus scholars 
acknowledge.   
On the other hand, I accept that, even after broadening our analytical lens, the 
downward trajectory of the collective bargaining regime has not been as steep as many 
RTB theorists predicted.   I argue that the model upon which this prediction was based 
was overly structural and that a more nuanced one is needed.  Such a model must better 
take into account a range of factors that mediate the impact of NAFTA-style trade 
liberalization on labor market regulation.  These mediations occur at the economic level, 
within the collective bargaining regime itself, and in the external environment that shapes 
the direction of state action. 
The paper is organized as follows.  In the remainder of this section, I address 
some preliminary and methodological issues.  In Part II, I present a simple model of the 
race to the bottom and then suggest an alternative, more nuanced model of the impact of 
trade liberalization on labor market regulation.  In Part III, I use that model to explore 
developments in the collective bargaining regimes of Canada and the United States.  In 




 From the time the idea of a Canada-US free trade agreement was first floated, its 
affect on labor market regulation was hotly contested.4  The debate had both an empirical 
and a normative dimension.  The empirical question was whether, under a free trade 
agreement that left each party at liberty to change its domestic labor standards (including 
collective bargaining laws, minimum standards laws, anti-discrimination law, workers’ 
compensation laws, occupational health and safety laws, and unemployment insurance), 
labor markets would become less regulated.  To greatly simplify, critics of the free trade 
agreements embraced the RTB hypothesis.  According to this view, as capital became 
more mobile it would seek to produce in the lowest cost jurisdiction.  Jurisdictions with 
high labor standards would be threatened with the loss of investment and, therefore, 
would be under pressure to cut back on them, while jurisdictions seeking to attract new 
investment would be tempted to lower labor standards.  The result would be regulatory 
competition that would push labor standards lower, unless other forces could be 
mobilized to counteract the downward pressure.  At the very least, supporters of strong 
labor standards would be put on the defensive, fighting to hold on to their past gains.5  
Although some supporters of free trade acknowledged that it would lead to less labor 
market regulation, most supporters this claim, arguing variously that the prisoners’ 
                                                 
4 These debates are reviewed by Brian A. Langille, “Canadian Labour Law Reform and 
Free Trade,” (1991) 23 Ottawa Law Review 581, 592-608 and George W. Adams, “The U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement and Collective Bargaining,” (1988) 14 Can.-U.S. Law Journal 41, 
46-52. 
5 For example, see Ian Robinson, “How Will the North American Free Trade Agreement 
Affect Worker Rights in North America?,” in Maria Lorena Cook and Harry C. Katz, eds., 
Regional Integration and Industrial Relations in North America (Ithaca, NY: Institute of 
Collective Bargaining, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell 
University, 1994), 105-131. 
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dilemma scenario that underpins the RTB analysis did not apply, that progressive 
competitiveness strategies could yield mutual gains for labor and capital, or that the 
positive effect of free trade on economic development would promote upward 
harmonization.6
The normative dimension of the debate was launched from the implicit premise 
that labor market regulation would be weakened under free trade.  The question was 
whether that would be an undesirable outcome.  Again, to greatly simplify, for free trade 
critics, the answer was clearly that weakened labor market regulation would be 
undesirable since it would undermine labor law’s social justice objectives: worker 
participation and voice achieved through collective bargaining would be undermined, as 
would protection against low wages, long hours of work, discriminatory treatment, 
unhealthy and unsafe working conditions, and the risk of income disruption due to injury, 
illness or unemployment.  Supporters of liberalized trade and regulatory competitiveness, 
on the other hand, viewed the question through the lens of comparative advantage and 
efficiency.  If competition in product markets is a good thing, then so too is competition 
among producers of regulatory policy.  Jurisdictions may choose to have sub-optimal (eg. 
unduly high) labor standards if that is the will of the electorate, but in a free-trade regime 
they will have to bear more of its cost (lower investment), as capital exits to jurisdictions 
with more favorable regulatory regimes.  If the threat of capital flight induces voters in 
otherwise pro-regulatory jurisdictions to choose more optimal (eg. lower) standards that 
                                                 
6 For a useful survey of the competing views, see Morely Gunderson, “Harmonization of 
Labour Policies under Trade Liberalization,” (1998) 53 Relations Industrielles 24; Brian Langille, 
“Competing Conceptions of Regulatory Competition in Debates on Trade Liberalization and 
Labour Standards,” in William Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatory Competition and 
Coordination (Oxford: Claredon, 1996), 479. 
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give them a comparative advantage, then this is a good outcome.  It is just another 
dimension of achieving net welfare gains through trade based on comparative advantage.  
Certainly right-wing think tanks that ardently support free trade routinely make the claim 
that high labor standards, including minimum wage laws and collective bargaining laws, 
negatively affect competitiveness and, therefore, should be reduced.7  
In this paper, my focus is on the empirical dimension of the debate rather than the 
normative, but I want to make one observation on what the normative regulatory 
competitiveness debate reveals about the goal of NAFTA-style trade liberalization:  that 
whatever else NAFTA may aim to accomplish, it is an “ambitious attempts to enlist 
external markets to obtain political ends.”8  Put somewhat differently, NAFTA should be 
viewed as part and parcel of a larger neo-liberal political project that aims to alter the 
balance of power between class forces and shift the role of the state from ameliorating the 
dysfunctional consequences of markets through social democratic or Keynesian welfarist 
policies to the promotion of global competitiveness.  In this way, NAFTA creates a 
“conditioning framework” that is intended to influence the policy choices of citizens and 
government.9   
                                                 
7 For example, see Jason Clemens and Mark Mullins, “Dangers in Rigid Labour Laws: 
Ministers Propose Prescriptive Changes to Labour Market Regulation” Online at 
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore1.asp?sNav=ed&id=317 (critique of proposed labor 
law reforms stating: “These labour reforms are being proposed despite competition from other 
jurisdictions”).   
8  Daniel Drache, “Dreaming Trade or Trading Dreams: The Limits of Trade Blocs,” in 
William Bratton et al., eds., International Regulatory Competition and Coordination (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1996), 417 at 418.    
9 Roberto Grinspun and Robert Kreklewitch, “Consolidating Neoliberal Reforms: Free 
Trade as a Conditioning Framework,” (1994) 43 Studies in Political Economy 33. 
 6
 
One final preliminary point is that it is difficult to make an overall assessment of 
the trajectory of Canadian collective bargaining law because constitutional jurisdiction 
over labor and employment has been held by the courts to rest primarily with the 
provinces.10  As a result, the federal government’s Canada Labour Code11 applies to 
about ten percent of the labor force, while the laws of the provinces or territories govern 
the remaining ninety percent of Canadian workers.  In theory it is possible to construct 
numerical indices that reflect changes in each jurisdiction over a fifteen-year period and 
then arrive at a quantitative national assessment of the trajectory of Canadian labor law.12  
I have adopted a different approach that is based on a qualitative assessment of changes 
in Canada’s three largest jurisdictions -- Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec – which 
contain about eighty percent of the labor force between them.  Mention will be made of 
developments in other Canadian jurisdictions as appropriate. There is less of a problem 
with American labor law because of federal preemption in the area of private sector 
collective bargaining.  State and local law, however, largely governs public sector 
collective bargaining, outside of the federal civil service.     
 
II.  Modeling NAFTA’s Impact 
 
A.  The Race to the Bottom Model 
Figure 1 presents a model of the RTB hypothesis.  Essentially, it predicts that 
under trade liberalization a downward regulatory competition will be promoted because 
                                                 
10  Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Snider [1925] A.C. 396. 
11 R.S.C. 1985, c. L-2. 
12 For an ambitious attempt to create such indices, see Richard N. Block, et al., Labor 
Standards in the United States and Canada (Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment 
Research).   
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of the interaction between its effects on the economy and on the institutions for regulating 
the labor market.  In terms of economic effects, the argument is that in liberalized trading 
regimes capital and product mobility is increased.  This is accomplished by the removal 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and by guaranteeing the security of investor rights 
against adverse state action.  NAFTA clearly accomplished this result (at least in 
principle) by phasing out remaining tariffs between the member countries and by 
eliminating the need for various import licenses and other non-tariff barriers.   As well, it 
protects NAFTA investors by guaranteeing national treatment (treatment no less 
favorable than that given to national investors), most-favored nation status (treatment no 
less favorable than that given to foreign investors of a third country), and property rights 
against expropriation or nationalization (or measures having equivalent effect).  It also 
creates an investor-state disputing process that permits NAFTA investors to bring 
complaints to an international tribunal with binding arbitration powers.13   
The increased mobility of capital and products enhances competition between 
employers who are forced to continually seek ways to produce more efficiently lest a 
lower-cost producer displace them.  Labor is one factor of production that will be 
affected by this intensified competitive struggle.  Employers in a more competitive 
environment will seek to increase labor productivity by lowering unit labor costs.  This 
can be accomplished by reducing the cost of employing a given quantity of labor or by 
                                                 
13 Ian Robinson, “How Will the North American Free Trade Agreement Affect Worker 
Rights in North America?,” in Maria Lorena Cook and Harry C. Katz, eds. Regional Integration 
and Industrial Relations in North America (Ithaca NY: Institute of Collective Bargaining, N.Y. 
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1994), 105, 106-108. 
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increasing the amount produced by that same quantity of labor, or, most likely, by some 
combination of the two (lower labor costs/higher productivity).   
Because capital is mobile, it will move to jurisdictions where it can produce most 
efficiently.  These choices will depend in part on the natural and infrastructural 
advantages of different locations, but governments will also adopt measures to maximize 
their attractiveness to existing and prospective investors.  Strong, comprehensive, and 
well-enforced labor standards will not be attractive, as studies have shown that many 
employers and multinational buyers perceive that higher standards result in competitive 
disadvantage.14  States that have high standards, therefore, will be pressured by 
employers to lower them,15 while states that have weak labor standards will, at the very 
least, be disinclined to improve them, and, at worst, be driven to reduce them even further 
to meet the competition from states that are weakening theirs.  Workers’ organizations 
will be less able politically to resist labor market deregulation in this environment 
because of the greater weight of market discipline on state action.  As well, their ability to 
organize and their economic leverage will be reduced by the threat of capital flight.16
 This model assumes that trade liberalization occurs within a particular 
institutional framework, one in which regulatory authority over labor markets remains 
                                                 
14 eg. Elliot, Labor Standards.  
15  For example, see Guylaine Valée and Jean Charest, “Globalization and the 
Transformation of State Regulation of Labour: the Case of Recent Amendments to the Quebec 
Collective Agreement Decrees Act,” (2001) 17 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 
and Industrial Relations 79 
16  Kate Bronfenbrenner, “Uneasy terrain: The impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, 
Wages, and Union Organizing,” (Washington DC: US Trade Deficit Review Commission, 
Commissioned Research Paper, 2000). 
 9
 
local while capital is free to move outside the regulation-producing jurisdiction.  If 
different institutional arrangements were created to coordinate the production of labor 
market standards among jurisdictions, or to create a new global regulation-producing 
authority then the regulatory competition would end, and the market for labor market 
standards would cease to operate, or at least be constrained.   
What, then, are the institutional arrangements made by NAFTA for labor market 
regulation?  NAFTA itself has little to say on social matters, except in the preamble 
where the parties resolve to “create new employment opportunities and improve working 
conditions and living standards in their respective territories” and to “protect, enhance, 
and enforce basic workers’ rights.”17  These are not, however, enforceable obligations.   
For this we must turn to the North American Accord on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), 18 
or labor side accord, concluded after NAFTA was signed to fulfill an election promise 
made by Bill Clinton that such an accord was a prerequisite to U.S. ratification.19  
NAALC sets out eleven guiding principles that each of the three signatories undertake to 
promote, subject to each party’s domestic law.   
 
1. freedom of association and protection of the right to organize 
                                                 
17  NAFTA, Preamble, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org 
18 NAALC, available at http://www.naalc.org/. 
19 On the background to the negotiation of the NAALC, see Kate E. Andrias, “Gender, 
Work, and the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement,” (2003) 37 San Francisco Law Review 521, 530-
43; Rainer Dombois, Erhard Hornberger & Jens Winter, “Transnational Labor Regulation in the 
NAFTA – A Problem of Institutional Design? The Case of the North American Agreement on 
Labor Cooperation between the USA, Mexico and Canada,” (2003) 19 International Journal of 
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 421, 425-28; John R. MacArthur, The Selling 
of “Free Trade”: NAFTA, Washington, and the Subversion of American Democracy (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2000). 
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2. the right to bargain collectively 
3. the right to strike 
4. prohibition of forced labor 
5. limitation of child labor 
6. minimum wage, hours of work an other labor standards 
7. elimination of employment discrimination 
8. equal pay for women and men 
9. occupational health and safety 
10. workers’ compensation 
11. migrant worker protection 
 
In addition to setting out principles, the accord requires each government to comply 
with and enforce its own labor laws. It establishes the Commission on Labor 
Cooperation, which is mandated to promote cooperative activities aimed at advancing the 
goals of the NAALC, but is not given enforcement powers.  For this purpose, the 
NAALC requires each signatory to appoint a National Administrative Office (NAO) and 
provides that a complaint alleging that a country is failing to enforce its own laws can be 
filed with the NAO of another country.  If the complaint is accepted, an investigation is 
conducted and if the NAO finds that the laws are not being enforced, it may request 
ministerial consultations.  If the complaint is not resolved at this level, and does not 
involve freedom of association, the right to bargain or the right to strike, then it may be 
referred to an Evaluation Committee of Experts.  Only complaints regarding occupational 
health and safety, child labor, or minimum wages laws can go before an arbitration panel 
vested with power to impose penalties for enforcement failures. 
 As many commentators have noted, while the NAALC expresses a commitment 
to a set basic labor rights, it does not actually require the parties to amend their own laws 
into order to implement them.  Rather, it simply requires the parties to enforce the laws 
they have.  In marked contrast to the trade-related provisions of NAFTA, which give 
investor rights priority over state sovereignty, the NAALC gives national sovereignty 
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priority over labor rights.  Each party retains the “right to establish its own domestic labor 
standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly it labor laws and regulations.”20   
 These constitutive arrangements create the conditions for regulatory competition 
described in Model 1: at the economic level, increased capital and product mobility 
generate more intense competition which gives capital greater economic leverage over 
labor; at the institutional level, labor standards are set nationally or sub-nationally, 
depending on the constitutional arrangements of each of the signatories, but not at a 
transnational level that coincides with the boundaries of capital and product markets.  
Moreover, mechanisms to encourage each jurisdiction to enhance, protect, or even 
enforce workers’ rights are weak.   
 It should be added that according to this model pressure would be greater on those 
states and jurisdictions with higher labor standards and most dependent on trade.  A 
recent study created a quantitative index of labor standards in the United States and 
Canada.  As most observers would have predicted, it found that overall Canada had 
higher labor standards than the United States.  Of particular interest for our purposes is 
that the study rated Canada’s collective bargaining laws as significantly stronger than 
those of the U.S.  Indeed, the gap between the United States and Canada on this measure 
was among the largest identified by the study.21  Further, Canada is the most trade 
dependent of the OECD countries.  Its exports as a percentage of gross national product 
                                                 
20 NAALC, Article 2. Clyde Summers, “NAFTA’s Labor Side Agreement and 
International Labor Standards,” (1999) 3 Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 173; 
Emmanuelle Mazuyer, “Labor Regulation in the North American Free Trade Area: A Study of 
the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation,” (2001) 22 Comparative Labor Law & 
Policy Journal 239, 245. 
21 Block, Labor Standards, 95 (the comparison year was 1998). 
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in 1995 was 33.5 while that of the United States was 8.  The OECD average was 23.1 
percent.22  As a result, this model would predict that the pressure on Canadian collective 
bargaining law would be particularly sharp.   
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    Increased Competition 




       
Figure 1 
Model of the Race to the Bottom Theory 
 
B.  The RTB Model’s Limitations 
 Recent literature examining the impact liberalized trading regimes on regulation, 
even in institutional contexts that foster regulatory competition, suggests that races to the 
bottom do not necessarily follow and that a variety of politico-economic processes 
contribute to regulatory outcomes.23  Some studies have illustrated this point through an 
examination of an analogous situation, labor market regulation in federal states.  A brief 
comparison of the United States and Canada, two federal states with very different 
constitutional divisions of powers over labor and employment law, is suggestive.   
In the United States, the courts held that the federal government’s National Labor 
Relations Act24 substantially pre-empted state jurisdiction, thereby limiting the 
opportunity for regulatory competition between states to occur.  This was partially 
                                                 
23 For example, see the essays collected in Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, eds., 
Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration (New York: Oxford UP, 2001). 
24 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); National Labor Relations 
(Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449.  
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undone by the Taft-Hartley Act,25 which permitted states to enact “right-to-work” laws 
that weakened union security.  A number of states exercised this power, particularly in 
the southern US.  That change, in conjunction with fierce employer resistance to 
unionization, racism and disunity in low union densities in southern states.26   
Although the spread of right to work laws slowed in the 1960s, their significance 
grew as employers became more aggressive in pursuing non-union production strategies.  
One way to achieve that result was to shift investment to greenfield sites, often located in 
right-to-work states.  These trends intensified in the 1980s, when northern and mid-
western states lost 1.5 million manufacturing jobs and $40 billion in pay, largely to right-
to-work states.27  Internal regulatory competition, however, cannot be invoked as the 
principal reason for the weakness of U.S. labor law.  Barenberg emphasizes other factors, 
including decentralized competition, ineffective coordination mechanisms, and the role of 
local state law.  Decentralized competition occurred because of the extremely fragmented 
bargaining structure that was institutionalized under the NLRA and because employers 
were free to divest from unionized plants and reinvest in non-union ones.  Coordinating 
mechanisms that might have overcome this fragmentation (such as peak union and 
employer associations, national political parties, etc) were too weak to play this role.  
Finally, local elites, particularly in the south, were able to mobilize state and local power 
                                                 
25 Labor-Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
26 Michael Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1993). 
27  Thomas A. Kochan, Harry C. Katz, and Robert B. McKersie, The Transformation of 
American Industrial Relations (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1994); Rick Fantasia and Kim Voss, Hard 
Work (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 74-75. 
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to defeat the exercise of federally guaranteed core labor rights.28  The result was a 
centralized but ineffective legal regime. 
 Canada presents an interesting comparison.  As mentioned, courts have held that 
federal jurisdiction over labor and employment is very limited, leaving regulatory 
authority vested in the provinces.  This constitutional arrangement favors regulatory 
competition, since capital is fairly free to move between provinces.  Yet, there has not 
been a race to the bottom.  For example, within a few years after the federal 
government’s industrial relations legislation was struck down in1925, nearly all the 
provinces passed laws either opting into it or creating parallel mechanisms of their own.  
During World War II the federal government’s powers expanded under emergency 
legislation and it introduced U.S. style collective bargaining law to Canada.  However, 
after the war’s end and the resumption by the provinces of their normal authority, with a 
few years, all provinces adopted a version of that scheme.29  Perhaps for this reason, the 
effect of federalism on the development of Canadian labor law has not received much 
scholarly attention.  In his book Reconcilable Differences Paul Weiler briefly argues that 
the provinces have served as “laboratories for legal experimentation” that generally led to 
                                                 
28 Mark Barenberg, “Labor Federalism in the United States: Lessons for Coordinated 
Decentralization in Supranational Regimes,” in Esty and Gerdin, Regulatory Competition and 
Economic Integration.  Also see Bruce Elmslie and William Milberg, “Free Trade and Social 
Dumping: Lessons from the Regulation of Interstate Commerce,” (May-June 1996) Challenge 46 
(arguing that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act eliminated socially destructive regulatory 
competition over child labor laws) and Lane Kenworthy, “Economic Integration and 
Convergence: A Look at the U.S. States,” (1999) 80 Social Science Quarterly 858 (arguing 
economic integration and regulatory competition has not led to harmonization, citing the limited 
spread of right-to-work laws as one example). 
29 Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, Labour Before the Law (Toronto: Oxford, 2001). 
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positive innovation.  The reason for this, he suggests, was that in large provinces, like 
Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, plant location decisions are largely driven by 
other factors such as the availability of raw materials, transportation costs, access to 
markets, etc, and that variation in labor law pales by comparison.30  To my knowledge, 
no one has argued that regulatory competition has exerted a significant downward 
influence on labor law and employment standards in Canada.31
 The simple lesson to be learned from this brief comparison is that a regime that 
creates the structural conditions for regulatory competition may still have strong labor 
laws, while a more centralized regime may not.  The structural scope for regulatory 
competition within federal states is only one factor that determines the trajectory of labor 
law.  The same lesson has been applied to international and regional free trade 
arrangements.  Indeed, as noted earlier, there seems to be an emerging consensus that the 
structural possibilities for regulatory competition opened up by NAFTA and similar kinds 
of trade agreements have not produced races to the bottom in the area of labor law.   
 
C.  Moving the Debate Forward: Towards a Reconstructed Model of Trade 
Liberalization’s Effect on Labor Market Regulation 
 
                                                 
30 Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell, 1980), 11. 
31 F.R. Scott, Essays on the Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 
ch. 25, argued that divided jurisdiction over labor relations was undesirable because it interfered 
with the ability of unions to bargain collectively with employers who operated nationally.  He did 




 The critics of the RTB model presented in Figure 1 make a strong case that it 
oversimplifies the effect of NAFTA-style trade liberalization on labor law.  In this part of 
the paper I respond to that criticism in two ways.  On the one hand, I argue that their 
assessment of NAFTA’s impact is based on an artificially narrow focus on private sector 
labor legislation.  Not only does this leave out public sector collective bargaining law but, 
more importantly, it fails to consider NAFTA’s impact on the effectiveness of the 
collective bargaining regime.  This results in an understatement of the NAFTA effect.  
On the other hand, I accept that a more nuanced, less structural model is needed that other 
factors need to be brought in to explain regulatory outcomes.  I identify and build into a 
revised model some mediating contextual factors that allow a greater role for agency and 
contingency.    
 
1.  From Private Sector Labor Legislation to the Effectiveness of Labor Market 
Regulation 
The argument that NAFTA has not promoted a RTB is based on an examination 
of private sector labor legislation.  Its use as a measure is appealing if only because 
legislative changes are relatively easy to track and assess.  This focus, however, misses 
what are arguably some of NAFTA’s more important effects.   
First, it ignores developments in public sector collective bargaining, presumably 
on the assumption, unstated in the literature, that changes in that area are unrelated to 
globalization.  That assumption, however, is problematic.  A number of commentators 
have pointed to links between globalization and government fiscal and tax policies, 
reductions in government services, and privatization, all major causes of the harsher 
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public-sector collective bargaining climate that has led to legislative retrenchment.32 
Belman et al expressly spell out these links.   
 
With greater global competition and reduced tariff barriers it is easier for 
capital to flow into countries with low taxes and few regulations and to 
export into high-cost countries.  Governments are under increased pressure 
to compete for business investment and the associated jobs, and this 
interjurisdictional competition may occur in the form of tax reductions and 
reduced regulations.  The tax reductions directly affect the public sector 
budget constraints and employment relations, especially given the 
importance of labor cost in the provision of many public services.  
Reduced regulation indirectly reduces the demand for government 
services, since such regulation was often provide through the public 
sector.33
 
It is also important to emphasize that in both Canada and the United States, 
collective bargaining is becoming a mechanism that is primarily used to establish terms 
and conditions of employment in the public sector.  Union density in the private sector in 
Canada has dropped below twenty percent, while public sector union density is above 
seventy-five percent. In the United States, private sector unionism has dropped below 
                                                 
32 Joseph B. Rose, Gary N. Chaison and Enrique de la Garza, “A Comparative Analysis 
of Public Sector Restructuring in the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean,” (2000) 21 
Journal of Labor Studies 601 (increased global competition, trade liberalization, and deregulation 
exerting tremendous pressure on public sector); Gene Swimmer, “Public-Sector Labour Relations 
in an Era of Restraint and Restructuring: An Overview,” in Gene Swimmer, ed., .Public-Sector 
Labour Relations in an Era of Restraint and Restructuring (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 1, 8 (governments in a globalized economy fear tax increases and regulation will lead to be 
unattractive to capital). 
33  Dale Belman, Morley Gunderson and Douglas Hyatt, “Public Sector Employment 
Relations in Transition,” in Dale Belman et al., eds., Public Sector Employment in a Time of 
Transition (Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association , 1996), 4-5.   
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nine percent, while public sector unionism is at thirty-seven percent.34   Hence an 
exclusive focus on private sector collective bargaining law yields a very distorted picture 
of the world of collective bargaining. 
Moreover, by focusing narrowly on legislation, researchers fail to consider what 
is arguably a more important outcome, the impact of trade liberalization on the 
effectiveness of labor market regulation.  The reasons why we ought to be concerned 
with regulatory effectiveness are fairly obvious.  Decades of law and society scholarship 
have emphasized that there is often a huge gap between law on the books and the law in 
action.  While law on the books may have a certain expressive or symbolic value, if it 
fails instrumentally to achieve its objectives then there has been regulatory failure and the 
putative beneficiaries of the law are deprived of it promise.  In short, we would get a very 
distorted view of reality if we were to rely solely on legislative change as a measure of 
the impact of trade liberalization on labor law.35  For these reasons the focus of a 
reconstructed model is on the effectiveness of labor market regulation 
Changes in the effectiveness of labor market regulation can come about in a 
number of ways.  First, labor legislation may be intentionally changed to reduce its 
                                                 
34 Andrew Jackson and Sylvain Schetagne, Solidarity Forever? An Analysis of Changes 
in Union Density (Ottawa: Canadian Labour Congress, Research Paper #25, July 2003), 14.  For 
the USA, see tables online at www.unionstats.com. 
35 David Weil, “Implementing Employment Regulation: Insights on the Determinants of 
Regulatory Performance,” in Bruce E. Kaufman, ed., Government Regulation of the Employment 
Relation (Madison: Industrial Relations Research Association Series, 1997), 429; Stephanie 
Bernstein et al., “Precarious Employment and Law’s Flaw’s: Identifying Regulatory Failure and 
Securing Effective Protection for Workers,” forthcoming in Leah Vosko, ed., Precarious 
Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005). 
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effectiveness.  This can be thought of as direct deregulation of labor markets and is a 
policy goal that is frequently advocated by those who believe existing levels or forms of 
state regulation are harmful to the economy.36  There may also be cases where legislative 
change has the unintended effect of making labor market regulation less effective.    
A second way that labor law can become less effective in through legislative 
inaction in the context of a rapidly changing labor market.  This constitutes what has been 
characterized as passive deregulation.37  An obvious example is that the value of certain 
labor standards, like the minimum wage, erodes over time due to inflation.  Inaction 
renders the scheme of regulation less effective in achieving its goal of protecting workers 
against socially unacceptable levels of low pay.  Another example is the development of 
structural mismatches between static schemes of labor market regulation and changes in 
the labor markets to which they apply.  This is particularly salient in the context of trade 
liberalization, which has promoted employers to pursue a variety of flexibilization 
strategies.   For example, much has been written about the growth of contingent or 
precarious employment and the problems it creates for current modes of labor regulation 
that were constructed on the platform of the standard employment relation.38   Yet, little 
                                                 
36 For example, in Canada the Fraser Institute regularly advances this position.  For 
example, see its publication, Measuring Labour Markets in Canada and the United States: 2004 
Edition, Online at http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=pb&id=690, 24-28. 
37 Kerry Rittich, Vulnerability at Work: Legal and Policy Issues in the New Economy 
(Ottawa: Report to the Law Commission of Canada, 2004), 24-30. 
38  On the growth of ‘non’ standard employment and the resulting labor regulation 
difficulties, see “Special Issue on Changing Contours of Employment and New Modes of Labour 
Regulation,” (2004) 42 British Journal of Industrial Relations 593; Leah Vosko, ed., Precarious 
Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada (Montreal and Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, forthcoming 2005); Katherine V. W. Stone, From Widgets to 
 21
 
has been done to revamp labor law to meet this challenge.  Similarly, a central premise of 
Canadian and U.S. labor law is that collective bargaining should occur at the enterprise 
level.  This arrangement has always presented a challenge for unions, especially outside 
oligopolistic sectors of the economy where employers resisted joint regulation with 
unions to take wages out of competition.  Trade liberalization has exacerbated the 
coordination problem and, as result, pattern bargaining has broken down and there is 
greater wage competition within the unionized workforce.39  Again, in these 
circumstances it is arguable that legislative inaction reduces the effectiveness of labor 
market regulation – a form of passive deregulation.  
A third way of altering the effectiveness of existing labor law is by administrative 
means.  Changes in the way the administrative bodies interpret and enforce the law can 
significantly alter its effectiveness.  These administrative changes are much less visible 
than legislation, and sometime will be referred to as disguised or hidden deregulation.  
Their effects, however, can be just as great as those made directly by legislation.  For 
example, a change in the interpretation of the meaning of the term “employee” could 
                                                                                                                                                 
Digits (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2004); Judy Fudge and Leah Vosko, “Gender, Segmentation 
and the Standard Employment Relationship in Canadian Labour Law,” (2001) 22 Economic and 
Industrial Democracy 271. 
39 On the issue of decentralized bargaining, see Harry C. Katz, “The Decentralization of 
Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and Comparative Analysis,” (1992) 47 Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 3; Anne Forrest, “Bargaining Units and Bargaining Power,” (1986) 41 
Relations Industrielles 840; Judy Fudge, “The Gendered Dimension of Labour Law: Why 
Women Need Inclusive Unionism and Broader-based Bargaining,” in Linda Briskin and Pat 
McDermott, eds., Women Challenging Unions: Feminism, Democracy, and Militancy (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993), 231.   On the problem of fragmentation under globalization, 
see Joseph B. Rose and Gary N. Chaison, “Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21st 
Century,” (2001) 56 Relations Industrielles 34, 44-49. 
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significantly alter the scope of the law’s application.40  Of course, the extent of 
administrative authority or discretion may vary significantly from scheme to scheme, but 
often there is usually a fair bit of leeway.  To the extent that courts play a role in 
supervising an administrative body’s interpretation of law or exercise of discretion, they 
too become implicated in the administration of the law and the effect of their 
interventions on regulatory effectiveness must also be considered. 
Administrative deregulation can also occur through the enforcement process.41  A 
reduction in the resources available for enforcement or a change in the enforcement 
strategy can greatly alter the regime’s effectiveness and its impact on labor costs.  For 
example, strong occupational health and safety laws can be rendered ineffective without 
weakening employers’ substantive duties by a reduction in the enforcement budget or by 
a decision to rely exclusively on persuasive strategies even after they have failed to alter 
an employers’ behavior.42 NAALC’s focus on the enforcement of existing labor laws 
treats this method of hidden deregulation is “illegitimate.”     
Finally, changes in the labor market that deter employees from exercising or 
asserting their legal rights also impair the regime’s effectiveness.  Fear of retaliation or 
concern that an employer will simply close up shop if forced to comply with the law is a 
                                                 
40 Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker, and Leah Vosko, The Legal Concept of Employment: 
Marginalizing Workers (Ottawa: Report for the Law Commission of Canada, 2002); Marc Linder, 
The Employment Relation in Anglo-American Law: A Historical Perspective (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1989). 
41  Bob Hepple, “Enforcement: The Law and Politics of Cooperation and Compliance,” in 
Bob Hepple, ed., Social and Labour Rights in a Global Context (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Pres, 2002), 238. 
42 Neil Gunningham and Richard Johnstone, Regulating Workplace Safety: Systems and 
Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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powerful disincentive for employees, whether they are contemplating joining a union, 
complaining about illegally low wages, or calling a health and safety inspector.43
A switch in focus from legislation to regulatory effectiveness creates significant 
methodological problems, since it is much more difficult to identify and estimate changes 
in effectiveness.  There is a rich literature on the effects of globalization on labor 
markets,44 which is largely unconnected to the literature addressing labor market 
regulation.  While the two questions should not be collapsed into one, an assessment of 
regulatory effectiveness will necessarily have to consider labor market changes, both for 
the purpose of discussing mismatches between regulatory arrangements and labor market 
realities and for data that is indicative of regulatory failure. 
 
2.  Bringing in Contextual Factors  
In modeling the impact of NAFTA on labor regulation, it is useful to identify two 
levels of determination: the structural and the politico-economic. I have already argued 
that NAFTA is intended to establish a conditioning framework within which capital, 
labor and government operate.  In that way, it operates at the structural level of 
                                                 
43 For example, see Richard Kazis and Richard L. Grossman, Fear at Work: Job 
Blackmail, Labor, and the Environment (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1992). 
44 For a small sampling of the literature on labor market effects, see Lori Kletzer, 
Imports, Exports, and Jobs: What Does Trade Mean for Employment and Job Loss? (Kalamazoo: 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2002); Robert Scott, The High Cost of ‘Free’ 
Trade (Washington D.C.: Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper, November 2003); Lessons 
from NAFTA: The High Cost of Free Trade (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
2003; Bruce Campbell et al, Pulling Apart: The Deterioration of Employment and Income in 
North America Under Free Trade (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 1999); Noel 
Gaston and Daniel Trefler, “The Labour Market Consequences of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement,” (1997) 30 Canadian Journal of Economics 18. 
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determination and Model 1 captures its key elements.  But, even after a set of constitutive 
decisions has been made, there are many mediating factors that will influence regulatory 
outcomes.  For example, Gunderson hypothesizes that for trade liberalization to promote 
downward harmonization four linkages must exist: 1) the laws in question must be 
enforced; 2) the laws must lead to an actual or perceived increase in labor costs to 
employers; 3) higher labor costs deter investment and influence plant location; and 4) 
jurisdictions must compete for investment on the basis of reducing costly labor laws.45  
This is a useful beginning, but I propose to elaborate a more general model that identifies 
three sets of mediating variables involving: economic complexity; internal adaptation in 
the collective bargaining scheme; and the external political, legal, ideological, and social 
environment that shapes government policy.46
There are three disputes in the economics literature that potentially complicate the 
relationship between trade liberalization and labor law.  The first is a dispute over the 
magnitude of the changes in world trade that are associated with globalization and trade 
liberalization.  For example, Fligstein shows that as a percentage of world GDP, world 
trade grew steadily from 1953 until it peaked in 1981, but that over the next sixteen years 
it fluctuated.  He concludes that, viewed over the longer term, world trade is not 
                                                 
45 Morely Gunderson, “Harmonization of Labour Policies under Trade Liberalization.” 
(1998) 53 Relations Industrielles 24.  
46  Fligstein, Architecture of Markets, 195 also argues that globalization theorists of both 
the left and right “want economic forces to be structural, inevitable, and everywhere dominating 
action.”  Instead, he offers a political-cultural approach that emphasizes the role of social and 
political forces.  
 25
 
overwhelming national economies.47  It is, however, undoubtedly the case that since the 
beginning of the free-trade era, there has been a phenomenal growth in trade between the 
U.S. and Canada, more than doubling between 1985 and 2002.48
A second dispute is over the relative significance of labor costs in investment 
decisions.  It has been argued that that even under conditions of competition, location 
decisions are driven by a variety of considerations, and that while local labor costs and 
the strength of local labor market regulation are factors, they are not necessarily the most 
important ones.  Indeed, some studies suggest that labor standards play a relatively minor 
role in location decisions compared to factors such as the availability of natural resources, 
transportation costs, tax considerations, and market size.49  Other studies, however, show 
that higher wage costs are associated with lower employment growth in labor-intensive 
industries.50   
                                                 
47  Fligstein, Architecture of Markets, 196-97.  Also see, Linda Weiss, The Myth of the 
Powerless State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 167-76. 
48  John W. Foster and John Dillon, “NAFTA in Canada: The Era of a Supra-
Constitution,” in Hemispheric Social Alliance, Lessons from NAFTA: The High Cost of Free 
Trade (2003), 47, Online at http://www.art-us.org/docs/high%20cost%20of%20free%20trade.pdf  
49 Kimberly Ann Elliot, Labor Standards, Development and CAFTA (Washington DC: 
Institute for International Economics, International Economics Policy Briefs, Number PB04-2, 
March 2004); Mario F. Bognanno et al, “The Influence of Wages and Industrial Relations 
Environments on the Production Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational Corporations,” (2005) 
58 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 171. 
50 James Heintz, Global Labor Standards: their impact and implementation (Amherst 
MA: Political Economy Research Institute, 2002).  Also see Banks, “Globalization and Labour 
Standards” (arguing that competition on the basis of low labor costs and standards is much more 
likely in underdeveloped nations). 
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A third dispute is over the optimality of a low-wage, low-standards economic 
strategy.  It has been argued that lower labor standards may not be as advantageous as 
RTB supporters assume.  For example, Kucera’s study concludes that lower labor 
standards do not improve competitiveness and that, to the contrary, higher labor standards 
may be associated with other characteristics that make a jurisdiction attractive for 
investors.51  Other studies have reached similar conclusions and argue that there is no 
empirical evidence to demonstrate that the low-wage, weak labor protection model of 
economic growth is optimal.52
No attempt will be made in this paper to sort out these disputes.  Rather, the point 
is simply that NAFTA’s economic effects are not as straightforward as the RTB model 
assumes.  Thus, while labor standards are part of the mix of considerations in the calculus 
of location decisions, their salience is likely to depend on a number of factors that include 
not only the macro-economic factors identified above, but also the degree of inter-
jurisdictional disparity in standards, and industry or even employer specific production 
regimes.  As well, it is likely that some labor standards are more related to 
competitiveness than others.  For example, it seems plausible to assume that strong anti-
discrimination laws are less likely to create or to be seen to create competitive 
disadvantage than laws that strictly regulate hours of work.   
                                                 
51  David Kucera, The Effects of Core Labor Rights on Labor Costs and Foreign Direct 
Investment: Evaluating the “Covnentional Wisdom (Geneva: International Institute for Labour 
Studies, Decent Work Research Programme, DP/130/2001).  Also, see Drusilla K. Brown, 
International Trade and Core Labour Standards: A Survey of Recent Literature (Paris: OECD, 
Labour Market and Social Policy, Occasional Papers, No. 43, 2000).   
52  See studies discussed in Fligstein, Architecture of Markets, 213-20. 
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To the extent that NAFTA’s economic effects are more moderate than RTB 
theorists assert, the degree of economic compulsion driving a race to the bottom is 
reduced, leaving more room for states, firms, and unions to make strategic choices.  This, 
in turn, marginally lessens the pressure on collective bargaining regimes and opens up 
spaces for political, legal, and civil society influences to operate.  
 A second point at which mediating factors operate is within the existing labor and 
employment law regime, particularly through the mechanism of internal adaptation.  Here 
it is assumed that trade liberalization and regulatory competition generate pressure on 
employers to increase output per unit of labor input, but that this pressure may be 
addressed within the existing regulatory framework.  To the extent that adjustment takes 
place within the existing framework, labor market deregulation will be a lower priority 
for employers.53    
Internal adaptation can occur on at least two levels.  At the macro-level, collective 
bargaining laws contained within themselves competing policy goals and visions.  For 
some, the goal of collective bargaining laws was to advance a vision of industrial 
democracy in which workers and organized workers would jointly determine the rules 
that would govern their joint endeavor.  This vision assumed that collective bargaining 
would continue within a capitalist economy, but it allowed for greater democracy on the 
assumption that either such arrangements would increase productivity or that competitive 
pressures would be alleviated by virtue of the spread of collective bargaining across 
                                                 
53  Passive and hidden deregulation has been discussed earlier as ways of reducing the 
effectiveness of labor market regulation, and they might also be considered as mechanisms of 
internal adaptation.  However, it is preferable to treat them as changes to the regime itself rather 
than as internal adaptations. 
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industry.  For others, collective bargaining was simply an alternative mechanism for 
negotiating terms and conditions of employment that employees might opt into, 
unconnected to any broader vision of how relations of production might be made more 
consistent with democratic norms.  The crucial point here is not which vision is 
preferable, but that the same statutory regime could function either as a promoter of 
industrial democracy or as an unadorned market mechanism depending on how it was 
interpreted and, more importantly, on the institutional, ideological, and political-
economic environment in which it operates.  To the extent that the more transformative 
ambitions of collective bargaining are reined in, it is hypothesized that employers in a 
NAFTA-style free-trade environment will find it less threatening.54   
A second or micro-level of internal adaptation is built into framework laws, like 
labor relations acts, that establish a baseline of rights and a set of procedures through 
which the specific parties establish and negotiate the substantive terms of their 
relationship.  Such a scheme is inherently adaptive insofar as it gives each party ample 
leeway to pursue its agenda, leaving the outcome to the exercise of bargaining power in 
the context of the market.  This internal adjustment could take two forms.  In the 
optimistic view, which mirrors the industrial democracy perspective although now is less 
explicitly linked to that agenda, unions and employers can take the high road on which 
they negotiate win-win arrangements that create stronger firms more able to compete in 
the global market, while providing workers with higher pay, more involvement and 
greater job security. In this view, competitiveness can be pursued cooperatively and 
progressively. The alternative is the low road, where management uses its leverage in the 
                                                 
54 Harry J. Glasbeek, “Labour Relations Policy and Law as a Mechanism of Adjustment,” 
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 179. 
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collective bargaining process to extract concessions and intensify work.  In either event, 
adjustment occurs, although winners and losers change.55   
Finally, the third set of mediating factors operates externally to the labor and 
employment law regime potentially as constraints on the structural pressures generated 
by trade liberalization.  These constraints can operate through the political system, the 
legal system, and civil society, and on different spatial (eg. national, international) levels.  
Beginning with the political, it has been argued that nation states are still a crucial site of 
resistance to globalization since social power is still rooted nationally.  Indeed, it is 
through the exercise of sovereign national power that liberalized trading regimes are 
constructed.  Thus, while these regimes may be designed with the aim of disciplining the 
democratic political process, it is arguably still possible for workers and others who are 
adversely affected to mobilize nationally and successfully constrain the neo-liberal 
project, through institutionalized channels, such as participation in elections and formal 
lobbying.56  Indeed, there is a large literature emphasizing that states have responded to 
the pressures of globalization in a variety of ways, reflecting the historical 
institutionalization of class and of state-market relations, often distinguishing between 
liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs).57  
                                                 
55 For a brief review, see Anil Verma and Richard P. Chaykowski, “Employment and 
Employment Relations at the Crossroads,” in Anil Verma and Richard P. Chaykowski, eds., 
Contract and Commitment: Employment Relations in the New Economy (Kingston, ON: IRC 
Press, Industrial Relations Centre, Queen’s University, 1999), 1, 10-14. 
56  Leo Panitch, “Globalization, States, and Left Strategies,” (1996) 23 Social Justice79; 
Jeffrey Ayres, “Power Relations under NAFTA: Reassessing the Efficacy of Contentious 
Transnationalism,” (2004) 74 Studies in Political Economy 101. 
57  eg. Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Geoffrey 
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Arguably, then, the race to the bottom could be thwarted or slowed because national or 
sub-national political resistance to the erosion of labor standards has been sufficient to 
counter the downward pressure.   
  Political action is not just confined to the national sphere and, indeed, the 
processes of globalization and trade liberalization have challenged social movements and 
labor organizations to develop transnational political and organizing strategies.  Jeffrey 
Ayres has recently examined the development of what he calls “contentious 
transnationalism” and finds there has been an increase in institutionalized political 
activity facilitated by the NAALC complaints procedure and in non-institutionalized 
activity such as cross-border campaigns focused on government action particularly in the 
US-Mexico border region.58  We will consider its effects in the context of international 
legal and civil society constraints.    
When we turn to legal restraints our focus is in on instruments that formally limit 
the power of governments to reduce labor standards.  At the national level, the clearest 
instance would be constitutional protections of labor rights, such as freedom of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
(social democratic corporatism has successfully responded to the pressures of globalization and 
offers a viable alternative); Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens, Development and Crisis of the 
Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Weiss, Myth of the Powerless State 
(globalization is firming up varieties of capitalism);  
58 Ayres, “Power Relations,” supra.; David M. Trubek et al., “Transnationalism in the 
Regulation of Labor Relations: International Regimes and Transnational Advocacy Networks,” 
(2000) 25 Law and Social Inquiry 1187 (elements of a network are emerging but not fully 
effective system in place).  Also see James Atleson, “The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: 
Transnational Labour Solidarity and the Obstacles of Domestic Law,” in Labour Law in an Era of 




association or guarantees of equality rights.  The strength of this kind of constraint will 
obviously vary from state to state and some labor rights will be better protected than 
others.  We will return to examine the respective constitutional rights of workers in 
Canada and the United States in our case study.   
At the international or transnational level, there is a wide range of instruments that 
potentially limit state action.  The International Labour Organization (ILO) has 
historically been the most important body engaged in the construction of an international 
labor rights regime through its declarations, conventions, and, most recently, its adoption 
in 1998 of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.  There is a 
large literature assessing the ILO’s effectiveness but for our purposes here it is sufficient 
to note that the ILO’s enforcement capacity is quite limited.59   Nevertheless, the norms 
generated by the ILO may influence domestic legal decision-making or may support 
society constraints.  Another potential source of international restraints is through the 
inclusion of labor protections in multilateral or bilateral trade agreements.  The issue of 
protecting labor standards through the WTO has been much debated, but no action has 
been taken, so this is a mere hypothetical.60  Labor standards are addressed in the 
                                                 
59 For a small sample of the literature, see Philip Alston, “’Core Labour Standards’ and 
the Transformation of the Labour Rights Regime,” (2004) 15 European Journal of International 
Law 457; Sean Cooney, “Testing Times for the ILO: Institutional Reform for the New 
International Political Economy,” (1999) 20 Comparative Labor law and Policy Journal 365; 
Virginia Leary, “The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights,” in Compa and Diamond, 
Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade, 22; Leah Vosko, “’Decent Work’: The 
Shifting Role of the ILO and the Struggle for Global Social Justice,” (2002) 2 Global Social 
Policy 19. 
60 eg. Clyde Summers, “The Battle in Seattle: Free Trade, Labor Rights, and Societal 
Values,” (2001) 22 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 61; Robert 
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NAALC, but as noted it only requires states to enforce their laws, not to establish or 
maintain a minimum set of labor standards.  Nevertheless, the NAALC does support in 
principle high labor standards and promotes them through the Commission for Labor 
Cooperation.  Thus, as in the case of the ILO, it is arguable that notwithstanding the 
weakness of the mechanisms for implementation, the NAALC may influence decision-
making by domestic courts and tribunals or, more generally, promote an ideological 
climate that exerts a countervailing force to the pressures for lower labor standards.61  
Again, the question of the strength of these effects is an empirical one and will be 
examined in the context of the case study.   
Finally, there may be ideological or civil society restraints on the erosion of labor 
standards.  The idea here is that if certain norms become sufficiently widespread 
governments and transnational corporations will be constrained in efforts to pursue 
competitiveness-enhancing and profit-maximizing strategies.  Thus, for example, 
Langille argues that the view that economic growth should be pursued independently of 
social justice and human rights is increasing being challenged by Sen and others who 
                                                                                                                                                 
Howse, “The World Trade Organization and the Protection of Workers’ Rights,” (1999) 3 Journal 
of Small & Emerging Business Law 131; Daniel S. Ehrenberg, “From Intention to Action: An 
ILO-GATT/WTO Enforcement Regime for International Labor Rights,” in Lance A. Compa and 
Stephen F. Diamond, eds., Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 163-180. 
61 Kate E. Andrias, “Gender, Work, and the NAFTA Labor Side Agreement,” (2003) 37 
San Francisco Law Review 521 (expressive function of NAALC); Emmanuelle Mazuyer, “Labor 
Regulation in the North American Free Trade Area: A Study of the North American Agreement 




argue that the promotion of human development should guide public policy.62  As this 
view gains popular support, governments will face greater political opposition to labor 
market deregulation, particularly when it adversely affects the most vulnerable workers.   
As well, the spread of a counter-hegemonic ideology may also promote the 
growth of strong civil society groups whose activities constrain the behavior of 
transnational corporations and governments.63  Campaigns by NGOs and workers’ rights 
advocacy groups to pressure transnational corporations into adopting codes of conduct 
governing work conditions of suppliers are the most prominent manifestation of this 
influence.64  Another example is the campaign recently initiated by a consortium of AFL-
CIO unions to pressure Walmart into raising wages and improving conditions, not by 
                                                 
62 Brian A. Langille, “Seeking Post-Seattle Clarity – and Inspiration,” in Joanne 
Conaghan et al., eds., Labour Law in an Era of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 137; Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999); Joseph 
Stiglitz, “Employment, Social Justice and Societal Well-Being,” (2002) 141 International Labour 
Review 9. 
63 Kimberly Ann Elliot and Richard B. Freeman, Can Labor Standards Improve Under 
Globalization? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2003), ch. 3 (referring 
to such activists as human rights vigilantes).  Also see Ruben J. Garcia, “Transnationalism as a 
Social Movement Strategy: Institutions, Actors and International Labor Standards,” (2003) 10 
University of California Davis Journal of International Law & Policy 1. 
64 The literature on corporate codes is voluminous.  For a small sample, see Adelle 
Blackett, “Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique 
of Codes of Corporate Conduct,” (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 401; Harry 
Arthurs, “Private Ordering and Workers’ Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of 
Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation,” in Labour Law in an Era of Globalization, 
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organizing its employees, but by mobilizing public opinion.65 Again, the question of the 
extent and direction of an ideological shift, and the effectiveness of civil society 
campaigns is an empirical one; here we are only concerned to identify factors that may 
counteract pressures to reduce labor standards arising from regulatory competition in a 
liberalized trading regime.   
Thus to conclude, a more nuanced model of the effects of NAFTA-style trade 
liberalization on labor standards must take into account a wide-range of variables.  Figure 
2 depicts such a model, incorporating the variables discussed above.  
                                                 
65 Steven Greenhouse, “Unions to Push for Better Pay at Walmart,” New York Times, 11 
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III.  Case Study: Collective Bargaining Law in Canada and the U.S. 
 
 Collective bargaining laws historically have been shaped by histories of struggle 
between workers acting collectively to improve the terms and conditions of their 
employment and to provide them with a means of participating in decision-making that 
affects them as individuals and as a group, and employers seeking to contain labor costs, 
limit intrusions on managerial prerogative and constrain industrial action.  The 
government becomes involved not as the neutral umpire, but with the goal of advancing 
what it views to be the public interest at any given time.  This may involve a variety of 
goals such as promoting industrial democracy and the values associated with it, 
maintaining the balance between production and domestic consumption, containing the 
spillover effects of industrial conflict, supporting export-led growth, etc. As a result, 
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labor law is likely to be sensitive to changes in the balance of power between labor and 
capital and shifts in state policy.66
 According to our nuanced model, NAFTA-style trade liberalization is liable to 
generate some degree of structural pressure on states to weaken labor market regulation 
through direct legislation action, passivity in the face of changing labor markets, and 
administrative changes.  The actual impact of trade liberalization, however, will depend 
on the kinds of mediating factors discussed above.  The following case studies of Canada 
and the U.S. each begin with an assessment of the trajectory of collective bargaining law.  
This is followed by an examination of two of the three mediating factors, internal 
adaptation and external constraints.  No attempt will be made to assess the extent to 
which, under liberalized trade, economic pressures are generating structural pressure to 
reduce the effectiveness of the collective bargaining regime in each country.  Rather, we 
adopt the fairly mainstream economic view that while collective bargaining laws may not 
be the most important factor influencing investment decisions, they are a consideration, 
especially in competitions between jurisdictions that are at similar levels of development. 
This is because, according to one recent survey, on average, union members receive 
higher wages, higher union densities are associated with higher wage mark-ups, and net 
company profits tend to be lower in unionized firms than in non-unionized firms.67  In 
the absence of offsetting benefits, the lower cost jurisdiction will be preferred.  The 
implication of this starting position, then, is that while NAFTA-style trade regimes 
                                                 
66  Glasbeek, “Labour Relations Policy.”  
67  Toke Aidt and Zafiris Tzannatos, Unions and Collective Bargaining: Economic Effects 
in a Global Environment (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002), 4.   
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promote some downward pressure on the effectiveness of collective bargaining regimes, 
there is scope for other factors to shape the outcome.  
 
A.  Canada 
 1.  The Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Law 
 
 a.  Legislative Change 
  
i. Private Sector Collective Bargaining 
   
Collective bargaining law in Ontario has been regularly amended since the 
enactment of the first Wagner-Act style collective bargaining act in 1943, following a 
pattern that has been characterized as cautious and pragmatic.68  Typically, legislative 
reforms came bundled in packages that made concessions to both union and employer 
demands.  For example, in 1980 the law was amended to require employers to deduct and 
remit union dues for all bargaining unit members (known in Canada as the Rand 
formula).  In exchange, employers were empowered to force a ratification vote on their 
most recent offer.69   
Labor law reform in the free-trade era has broken from this pattern.  The New 
Democratic Party (NDP) formed the government for the first time in 1990 and was under 
pressure from its union supporters to amend the collective bargaining law.  The 
government hoped to achieve a union-management consensus but, after lengthy 
consultations failed to yield a compromise, it introduced Bill 40 over the vociferous 
                                                 
68 Joseph B. Rose, “Ontario: The Conservative Hegemony,” in Mark Thompson et al., 
eds., Beyond the National Divide: Regional Dimensions of Industrial Relations (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 33. 
69 Eric Tucker, “Reflections on the History of Forced Ratification Votes in Ontario,” 




objections of employers.  The bill was eventually passed after extended public hearings 
and came into force on January 1, 1993.70  The most significant changes included 
expedited unfair labor proceedings, interim reinstatement of workers fired during an 
organizing campaign, broader provision for first contract arbitration, better union access 
to employees, a partial ban on replacement workers, extended job protection during 
strikes, and a right to picket on some third-party property.  Bill 40, however, was short-
lived.  The Progressive Conservative Party (PC) won a sweeping majority in 1995 and 
one of its highest priorities was labor law reform.  Bill 7 was passed without any 
consultation or public hearings.  Not only did it repeal the NDP reforms, but Bill 7 also 
introduced its own innovations, the most important being an end to the card-based system 
of certification (whereby unions could get certified by signing up 55% of the members of 
the bargaining unit), mandating instead elections in every case.71  This was followed by 
another set of amendments in 1998, the most important of which was to strip the labour 
board of its power to order remedial certifications in the event it found that unfair labor 
practices prevented employees from expressing their true wishes in an election.72  This 
was followed two years later by Bill 139, which promoted union decertification.73  More 
                                                 
70  S.O. 1992, c. 21. 
71 Labour Relations Act, 1995 (Bill 7), S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A; Felice Martinello, “Mr. 
Harris, Mr. Rae and Union Activity in Ontario,” (2000) 24 Canadian Public Policy 17. 
72 Economic Development and Workplace Democracy Act  (Bill 31), S.O. 1998, c. 8, 
known to its critics as the Walmart Act.  This was because the stripping of the power of remedial 
certification was a response to its exercise by the board in a decision involving an unfair labor 
practice complaint against Walmart for its actions during an organizing drive at its Windsor store.  
See United Steelworkers of America v. Walmart [1997] OLRB Rep. 141.  After extended 
litigation, the union eventually abandoned the bargaining rights it was awarded. 
73  Labour Relation Amendment Act, 2000 (Bill 139), S.O. 2000, c. 38. 
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recently, a Liberal government was elected in 2003 and in the fall of 2004 it introduced 
its own package of labor law reforms.  If passed, the board’s power to order remedial 
certification and to reinstate on an interim basis employees terminated during an 
organizing campaign will be restored.  Card certification, however, would not, except in 
construction.74
 The history of labor law reform in British Columbia has followed a somewhat 
different pattern, alternating between employer-driven reforms and ones emerging from 
consultative processes.  In 1987, prior to CUFTA, a conservative Social Credit 
government pushed through a set of one-sided reforms that ended card count 
certification, facilitated decertification, restricted picketing and boycotts, and empowered 
the chair of the labour commission to intervene in trade disputes.  According to the then 
Labour Minister, Lyall Hanson, the twin goals of the law were “cost containment and 
international competitiveness.”75  A majority NDP government was elected in 1991 and it 
established a bipartite labor-management consultation committee that produced a set of 
consensus recommendations.  The government accepted these recommendations, 
including a return to card-based certifications.  The parties could not reach a consensus 
on three issues and the government crafted a set of compromises.  It banned replacement 
workers, retained most of the restrictions on picketing, and declined to implement a 
broader-based bargaining scheme for traditionally non-union sectors.  In 1998 it enacted 
another set of reforms, the most important of which established sectoral bargaining for 
the construction industry.  In 2001 a right-leaning Liberal government was elected and it 
                                                 
74 An Act to amend certain statutes relating to labour relations (Bill 144), 1st Reading, 
November 3, 2004. 
75  Cited in Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, 104. 
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promptly repealed the sectoral bargaining provision and restored mandatory voting for all 
certifications, but retained the ban on replacement workers.76
 Quebec entered the free-trade era with one of the more progressive private sector 
collective bargaining laws, having been the first province to ban replacement workers and 
make dues deductions mandatory.  It also had a decree law that allowed the minister of 
labour to extend the application of a collective agreement to all firms, union and non-
union, that were in the same industrial and geographic sector.  Since the free-trade era, 
there have been relatively few changes to the basic collective bargaining law and they 
have largely aimed to strengthen it.  In 1994 the three-year maximum term was 
eliminated (except for first agreements) and in 2001 a more extensive set of amendments 
streamlined the administration of the code, better protected individual and union rights in 
cases of contracting out, and provided for forced ratification votes.  On the other hand, 
the decree system has been weakened over the same period.  In 1996 the act was 
amended to require a ministerial review of all decrees prior to their renewal to determine 
whether the decree impairs the competitiveness of the affected industries with enterprises 
outside of Quebec.  In the years since this change, nearly a third of all decrees were not 
renewed, almost all covering manufacturing industries.  By 2000, 73% of manufacturing 
                                                 
76 Mark Thompson and Brian Bemmels, “British Columbia: The Parties Match the 
Mountains,” in Beyond the National Divide, 97.  On earlier legislative reforms, see Harry 
Arthurs, “The ‘Dullest Bill’: Reflections on the Labour Code of British Columbia,” (1974) 9 
University of British Columbia Law Review 280 and Paul Weiler, Reconcilable Differences: New 
Directions in Canadian Labour Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1980). 
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employers and 60% of manufacturing employees formerly covered by decrees were now 
excluded.77
 Changes in a number of other Canadian jurisdictions reflect the unevenness 
observed in the three largest provinces.  NDP governments in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, and a Liberal government in Ottawa have strengthened their private sector 
collective bargaining laws in various ways.  On the one hand, there has been a shift away 
from card-count certifications to mandatory votes.  Prior to the free-trade era only one 
province required votes.  Since 1988 the number has increased to five (Nova Scotia, 
Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario, and British Columbia), covering about 
two-thirds of the labor force.78   
Most commentators have concluded that Canadian private sector labor law has 
remained relatively stable in the free-trade era.79  While I do not fundamentally disagree 
with these judgments, they fail to give proper weight to the most significant overall 
change – the move to mandatory voting to establish majority support for union 
representation.  Numerous studies have found that the shift from card counts to elections 
                                                 
77 Michel Grant, “Quebec: A New Social Contract – From Confrontation to Mutual 
Gains?,” in Beyond the National Divide, 51; Vallée and Charest, “Globalization and the 
Transformation of State Regulation of Labour”; Gauvin, “Labour Legislation in Canada.”  
78 It was up to six, a newly elected NDP government repealed the 1997 mandatory vote 
provision in Manitoba.  Percentage calculated from Statistics Canada. Labour Force Survey 
(January 7, 2005 release), Online at http://www.statcan.ca/english/Subjects/Labour/LFS/lfs-
en.htm 




significantly reduces union success rates and lead to a lowering of trade union density.80  
As a result, the negative effect of this change likely outweighs the positive effect of other 
changes.  
  
 ii. Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
The picture changes dramatically if we expand our horizons to include public 
sector collective bargaining.  Public sector collective bargaining was accepted in Canada 
in the mid-1960s to early 1970s and has always differed in some respects from the private 
sector model, particularly with respect to dispute resolution.  Strikes and lockouts were 
often prohibited and instead binding interest arbitration was used to resolve bargaining 
impasses.  Public sector union density rose rapidly, far exceeding that of the private 
sector, and has remained high.  But from early on governments often found their own 
legislated schemes inadequate to achieve their policy objectives and they began to enact 
special legislation overriding the existing labor-relations framework, including back-to-
work laws to end strikes and blanket wage restraints.  As well, essential service 
designations were expanded to reduce the number of workers legally permitted to strike.  
                                                 
80 These studies are reviewed in John Goddard, “Do Labor Laws Matter? The Density 
Decline and Convergence Thesis Revisited,” (2003) 42 Industrial Relations 459 at 476.  In 
addition, see Chris Riddell, “Union Certification Success under Voting Versus Card-Check 
Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia, 1978-1998,” (2004) 57 Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review 493; Sara Slinn, "The Effect of Compulsory Certification Votes on Certification 
Applications in Ontario: An Empirical Analysis," (2003) 10 Canadian Labour and Employment 
Law Journal 399. 
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The use of these devices increased in the 1980s, leading one commentator to characterize 
the regime as one of “permanent exceptionalism.”81   
These kinds of legislative interventions have peaked during the free-trade era.  
Between 1991 and 1996, 11 of the 15 governments that were in power relied on special 
legislation to extend contracts, impose wage cuts or freezes, require workers to take 
unpaid leave days, or override job security provisions to facilitate downsizing.82  Since 
1996 back-to-work legislation was used by British Columbia, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia Quebec, and Saskatchewan to end nurses strikes (in most cases, the government 
imposed its offer rather than follow the more usual practice of sending the dispute to 
binding arbitration).  British Columbia and Alberta also passed back-to-work legislation 
to end teachers’ strikes as did the Federal government to end strikes by its blue-collar and 
corrections employees.  As well, the Federal government suspended interest arbitration in 
1997, making strikes the exclusive method of dispute resolution.  At the same time, it 
greatly expanded the essential service designation, the effect of which was to leave 
                                                 
81 Leo Panitch, “Toward Permanent Exceptionalism: Coercion and Consent in Canadian 
Industrial Relations,” (1984) 13 Labour/Le Travail 133.  The argument has since been expanded 
and updated in a book now in its third edition: Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, From Consent to 
Coercion: The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms, 3rd rev. ed. (Aurora, ON: Garamond, 2003).  
Also see Joseph B. Rose, “Public Sector Bargaining: From Retrenchment to Consolidation,” 
(2004) 59 Relations Industrielles 271 and Daniel Drache and Harry Glasbeek, The Changing 
Workplace (Toronto: Lorimer, 1992), ch. 9. 
82 Gene Swimmer, “Public-Sector Labour Relations in an Era of Restraint and 
Restructuring: An Overview,” in Gene Swimmer, ed., Public-Sector Labour Relations in an Era 
of Restraint and Restructuring (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1.   
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employees with no dispute resolution mechanism short of an illegal strike.83  Rose argues 
that in recent years governments have maintained a hard line to better institutionalize the 
changes they made during the 1990s.  To accomplish this result they have heavily relied 
on legislation that restricts the right to strike, puts controls on interest arbitration, and 
limits bargaining subjects.  Rose concludes, “Governments are not prepared to restore a 
genuine collective bargaining system.”84
 
b.  Passive and Hidden Deregulation? 
  
 Trade liberalization has spurred employers to change a range of employment 
practices that adversely affect the effectiveness of existing collective bargaining 
scheme.85  These include the use of contingent workers and the outsourcing of work.  
Contingent workers are more difficult to organize because they are often less attached to 
the workplace and also because their employment status may be uncertain, even after the 
extension of the collective bargaining regime to “dependent contractors.”86  Outsourcing 
also puts a large burden on union organizing resources.  Successor rights are available in 
a rather narrow range of circumstances, so that when a unionized plant contracts work 
                                                 
83 Gene Swimmer and Tim Bartkiw, “The Future of Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
in Canada,” (2003) 24 Journal of Labor Research 579, 582-85. 
84 Rose, “Public Sector Bargaining,” 287.  Also see Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to 
Coercion, 183-208. 
85 Morley Gunderson and Anil Verma, “Free Trade and Its Implications for Industrial 
Relations and Human Resource Management,” in Regional Integration and Industrial Relations 
in North America, 167, 170-2. 
86 Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker, and Leah Vosko, “Changing Boundaries of Employment: 
Developing a New Platform for Labour Law,” (2003) 10 Canadian Journal of Labour and 
Employment Law 361; Judy Fudge et al., Self-Employed Workers Organize: Unions, Law and 
Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, forthcoming 2005). 
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out, the union must re-organize the workers who are hired to perform what was 
previously bargaining unit work.  These are not the only reasons why private sector union 
density has declined in Canada during the free trade era by at lest two percentage points 
to around eighteen percent, but it is part of the explanation.87  
 Flexibilization also has a significant impact on unions’ bargaining power in the 
context of a scheme that only requires collective bargaining to occur on a workpace-by-
workplace basis.  The proliferation of small bargaining units not only increases the costs 
of bargaining, but also erodes union bargaining power.  The result is that outside of a few 
sectors where pattern bargaining has survived, unions have been unable to take wages out 
of competition.  As well, even within unionized workplaces, there has been a significant 
increase in contingent employment.  For example, the percentage of newly hired 
employees in unionized jobs has grown from nineteen in 1989 to twenty eight in 2004.88  
We will look more closely at the consequences of this development when we discuss 
collective bargaining itself as a mechanism of adjustment.  Here it is sufficient to note 
that the failure to adopt broader-based bargaining schemes or other measures aimed at 
redressing the structural misfit between the current law governing bargaining structure 
                                                 
87 The significance of the lack of fit between collective bargaining law and the decline in 
trade union density is a matter of some debate.  See John O’Grady, “Beyond the Wagner Act, 
What Then?” in Daniel Drache, ed., Getting on Track (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1992), 153 (pessimistic view of the viability of the Wagner Act model); Andrew Jackson, 
“Solidarity Forever? Trends in Canadian Union Density,” (2004) 74 Studies in Political Economy 
125 (structural shifts in employment had limited impact on private sector union density decline). 
88  René Morisette and Anick Johnson, Are Good Jobs Disappearing in Canada, (Ottawa: 




and changes in the labor market should be considered a form of passive labor market 
deregulation. 
 Turning to administration and enforcement, to my knowledge there is no evidence 
that these issues have loomed large as a mechanism of adjustment to trade liberalization 
in Canadian collective bargaining law.  Canadian labor boards have not altered their 
interpretation of their enabling statutes during the free-trade era in a manner that has 
further limited the law’s effectiveness.  Of course, this is not to say that prior to the free-
trade era labor relations boards single-mindedly pursued policies favorable to the growth 
and effectiveness of collective bargaining,89 but rather that there has not been a notable 
shift in the compromises embedded in board jurisprudence.  Indeed, on at least some 
occasions, labor boards have attempted to respond to the challenges posed by employer 
resistance to collective bargaining and flexibilization strategies.90  In Ontario, the 
Conservative government threatened the independence of the labour board by changing 
long-standing appointment practices, but it suffered legal setbacks and other governments 
have not followed suit.91  Moreover, the Supreme Court of Canada has been giving labor 
boards greater leeway to interpret their enabling statutes in the free-trade period than had 
                                                 
89 For a critical assessment, see Glasbeek and Drache, The Changing Workplace, 57-97. 
90 For example, a number of boards have found held that Walmart’s tactics for resisting 
unionization constitute unfair labor practices.  For example, see United Steelworkers of America 
v. Wal-Mart Canada [1997] OLRB Rep. 141; Walmart Canada and UFCW, Local 1518 [2003] 
BCLRBD No. 156.  The Quebec labor board has adopted a more expansive approach to successor 
rights.  See cases cited in Ivanhoe Inc. v. UFCW, Local 500 [2001] S.C.R. 565. 
91 Kevin M. Burkett, “The Politicization of the Ontario Labour Relations Framework in 
the 1990s,” (1998) 6 Canadian Journal of Labour and Employment Law 161; Craig Flood, 
“Hewat v. Ontario,” ibid, 263. 
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been the case previously.92  In short, it would be difficult to claim administrative 
practices changed in a manner that undermined the effective of the collective bargaining 
scheme.93
 
 2.  Contextual Mediations 
  
a. Internal Adjustments: Bargaining 
 The extent to which post-World War II Canadian statutory collective bargaining 
schemes were ever an effective vehicle for constructing a more democratic regime of 
industrial citizenship is a matter of considerable debate.94  What is significant, however, 
is that there is now widespread agreement that the aspirations of those who viewed the 
post-war collective bargaining scheme as a mechanism through which a new world of 
industrial citizenship could be created have been dashed.  Even more to the point, is that 
globalization has been identified as one of the crucial reasons for this failure.95  Thus, at a 
                                                 
92 On the 1980s, see Brian Etherington, “Arbitration, Labour Boards and the Courts in the 
1980s: Romance Meets Realism” (1989) 68 Canadian Bar Review 405. The decision in Ivanhoe 
Inc. v. UFCW, Local 500 [2001] 2 S.C.R. 566, is more reflective of the court’s current , less 
interventionist practice.   
93 In Ontario, the Conservative government changed the appointment/reappointment 
policy to the labor board that arguably undermined its independence, but there has not been a 
study of whether this change had an effect on the labor board’s policies and practices.  
94 The classic articulation of this aspiration can be found in Task Force on Labour 
Relations, Canadian Industrial Relations Final Report (Woods Task Force)(Ottawa: Privy 
Council, 1968), paragraph 296.  Also, see Harry Arthurs, “Developing Industrial Citizenship: A 
Challenge for Canada’s Second Century,” (1967) 45 Canadian Bar Review 786.  For assessments 
that emphasize the limitations of the scheme, see Fudge and Tucker, Labour Before the Law; 
Judy Fudge and Harry Glasbeek, “The Legacy of PC 1003,” (1995) 3 Canadian Labour and 
Employment Law Journal  357.   
95  H.W. Arthurs, “The New Economy an the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and 
the Future of Labour Arbitration,” (1999) 7 Canadian Labor and Employment Law Journal 45-63 
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macro-level, it is fair to say that the collective bargaining regime has internally adapted to 
the broader environment in which it operates. 
Turning to the micro-level of adjustment, there are a number of indicators that the 
predominant approach of employers has been to use forcing strategies to extract 
concessions at the bargaining table, rather than adopting ‘high road’ strategies to increase 
productivity through improved conditions, more participation, and greater job security.96  
With respect to wages, the union-nonunion wage differential is estimated to have shrunk 
from approximately 25% in the late 1970s to 8% in 1997.  Major private sector wage 
settlements have decreased from an average of 4.8% between 1982 and 1988 to an 
average of 2.6% between 1989 and 2001. There has also been a breakdown of the linkage 
between productivity gains and wages increases. For example, between 1992 and 2002, 
productivity in manufacturing increased nearly 18% while real hourly wages increased by 
just 3.3%.97 As well, pattern bargaining has been abandoned or disrupted in many 
industries.  As these data indicate, despite making the protection of wages and benefits 
their top priority, unions have had limited success resisting employer demands for labor 
cost concessions.98  Job security and lay-off protection has become the second highest 
bargaining priority of unions, but few have succeeded in obtaining substantive limitations 
                                                                                                                                                 
and The New Economy and the Demise of Industrial Citizenship (Kingston: Queen’s University 
Industrial Relations Centre, 1996). 
96  Verma and Chaykowski, “Employment and Employment Relations,” 12; Gordon 
Betcherman, “Workplace Change in Canada: The Broad Context,” in Verma and Chaykowski, 
Contract and Commitment, 21, 27-30. 
97 Calucated from Panitch & Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, Appendix I, Table II. 
98 Rose and Chaison, “Unionism,” 45; Andrew Jackson, From Leaps of Faith to Hard 




on contracting out or hiring contingent workers.99  Moreover, the average number of 
strikes per year has declined sharply from 693 between 1982 and 1988 to 409 between 
1989 and 2001.100   
 The point is not that collective bargaining imposes no restraints on unionized 
employers -- unionized employees continue to enjoy a higher level of protection than 
non-unionized employees – but rather that in the free-trade era employers have been able 
to use the bargaining process as a mechanism of adjustment to the demands of a more 
competitive environment.  Their ability to make these adjustments has reduced employer 
demand for weaker private sector collective bargaining laws.     
   
 b. External Constraints 
  
 i. Political 
Unions in Canada have a long history of political engagement that, in the post-
World War II era, has principally taken the form of support for the NDP.  Although the 
NDP has never formed or come close to forming the federal government, it has formed 
provincial governments in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, 
including during the free-trade era (British Columbia 1992-2001, Manitoba 1999-present, 
Ontario 1990-95, Saskatchewan 1991-present).  During each of these periods of NDP 
government, private sector collective bargaining laws were modestly strengthened to 
meet some union demands.  On the other hand, when ideologically conservative 
governments have been in power (Ontario 1995-2003, Alberta 1972-present, British 
Columbia 2001-present), private-sector collective bargaining laws have been weakened 
in response to employer demands. Quebec is a special case where a separatist political 
                                                 
99 Rose and Chaison, ibid, 45-7. 
100 Calculated from Panitch & Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, Appendix I, Table III. 
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project has provided the foundation upon which to build a limited corporatist entente 
through which it has been possible to negotiate labor-management compromise for much 
of the 1990s.  The election of right-leaning Liberal government in 2003 may result in 
private sector industrial relations becoming more contentious.101   
The political orientation of the government in power has also had a significant 
impact on public sector labor relations, with governments led by centrist and conservative 
parties being far more aggressive in their resort to unilateral legislation to constrain 
public sector unions and limit collective bargaining than governments led by parties with 
a social democratic orientation.  However, even left-of-centre parties have supported 
back-to-work legislation and other ‘exceptional’ interventions limiting ‘normal’ operation 
of public sector collective bargaining laws.102
 
ii.  Legal 
As noted, hard law constraints may operate at both the international and the 
national level.  At the international level, two ILO conventions protect freedom of 
association, Nos. 87 and 98.  Canada ratified the first in 1972 but not the second.  It is 
generally accepted, though, that all members of the ILO are obliged to protect the right to 
freedom of association and this obligation was further advanced in 1998 with the 
adoption of the Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work.103  The 
mechanisms for enforcing these obligations, even when nations have ratified the relevant 
                                                 
101 Pantitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion; Thompson, Beyond the National 
Divide. 
102 Swimmer and Bartkiw, “Future,” 583, Panitch and Swartz, passim. 
103 Leary, “The Paradox of Workers’ Rights,” 29.   
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conventions, however, are extremely weak, depending largely on monitoring, reporting, 
and, ultimately, public pressure.  These have proven to have little or no effect on 
constraining the actions of Canadian governments, particularly when dealing with public 
sector workers.  Panitch and Swartz examined complaints made to the ILO for violations 
of freedom of association by G-7 countries between 1954 and 2001.  During that period a 
total of 66 complaints have been filed against Canada, giving it the dubious distinction of 
having the most.  Notably, 35 of these complaints were filed between 1992 and 2001.104   
The ILO Committee of Freedom of Association has repeatedly noted with regret that 
various Canadian governments are violating workers’ freedom of association and 
requested that the offending legislation be repealed.  These findings and requests have 
been ignored.105   
Turning to the NAALC, it will be recalled that its enforcement provisions aim to  
prevent deregulation through non-enforcement of domestic law.  As such, it does not 
purport to operate as a constraint on direct or passive labor market deregulation, although 
it could have an indirect effect.  Perhaps for this reason Canadian unions have continued 
                                                 
104  Panitch and Swartz, From Consent to Coercion, 54-7, 208-9.  At least half-a-dozen 
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105 For example, see the most recent report of the committee of experts, CEACR: 
Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise, 1948 Canada (ratification: 1972) Published: 2004, Online at 
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to funnel the overwhelming majority of their complaints through the ILO rather than 
through the NAALC.   
Two complaints have been brought against Canada under the NAALC.  The first 
arose out of the closure of a McDonald’s restaurant in Quebec, allegedly to avoid 
unionization.  The submitters claimed that McDonald’s exploited loopholes in Quebec’s 
labor law that permits employers to delay certification proceedings and then close 
facilities to avoid unionization.  The American NAO accepted the case for review, but 
shortly thereafter an agreement was reached between the submitters and the Quebec 
government to include this issue in a review process of the Quebec Labour Code that was 
already underway.  As a result, the complaint was withdrawn and the file closed.  In 2001 
administrative changes were made to the Code that accelerated the certification process, 
but nothing was done to address plant closings to avoid unionization.106   
 The second complaint arose out of a provision in federal legislation that deems 
rural route mail couriers not be employees for the purposes of collective bargaining law, 
thereby depriving them of access to a statutory collective bargaining scheme.  The 
American NAO refused to accept this complaint because it did not raise a question 
related to the enforcement of law. The rural route mail couriers subsequently achieved 
voluntary recognition after a lengthy and expensive organizing drive by the postal 
workers’ union.107    
                                                 
106 Lance Compa, “NAFTA’s Labour Side Agreement Five Years On: Progress and 
Prospects for NAALC,” (1999) 7 Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal, 1, 22-24; 
personal communication with Stephanie Bernstein, 13 January 2005 (on file with author). 
107 Compa, ibid.; Judy Fudge et al, Self-Employed Workers Organize (forthcoming). 
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In short, NAALC has been little used as a mechanism of redress in Canada and its 
direct impact has been quite limited.  It does not restrict the power of Canadian 
governments to pass legislation violating freedom of association and the problem of 
government non-enforcement has not loomed large in the collective bargaining regime.   
International law norms, hwoever, may have indirect effects, including their 
influence on the development of national legal norms. With this in mind, we turn to 
domestic legal constraints on labor market regulation, the principal one being the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which can into force in 1982.  The Charter protects freedom of 
association but does not define its parameters.  Union supporters hoped the courts would 
find it protected the right to bargain collectively and to strike, while opponents hoped it 
would be found to limit union security clauses.  Initially both sides were disappointed as 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s refusal to constitutionalize labor rights, including the 
right to bargain collective and strike, left the state ample scope to craft its labor relations 
policy as it saw fit.108  A recent trilogy of decisions, however, indicates there has been a 
bit of a shift. 
In Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General)109 the court considered a Conservative 
government law excluding agricultural workers from the Ontario’s collective bargaining 
statute.  The law not only deprived agricultural workers of access to a statutory collective 
bargaining scheme, but they also lost protection against being discharged or 
discriminated against for engaging in organizing activity.  In earlier cases, the court had 
                                                 
108 For a discussion of these early cases, see Dianne Pothier, “Twenty Years of Labour 
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held that freedom of association is an individual right and that the state only had to 
refrain from barring workers from forming associations.  It did not require the state to 
positively protect the exercise of that freedom from adverse action by non-governmental 
individuals and organizations.110  In Dunmore the court moderated its earlier position in 
two ways.  First, it recognized that freedom of association protects some collective rights.  
Second, it also found that freedom of association sometimes requires the state to protect 
particularly vulnerable workers from private-party interference.  In the court held that the 
government of Ontario was required to protect agricultural workers against unfair labor 
practices and that their associations had the right to make representations on their behalf 
to employers.  This was thin constitutional protection, indeed, since it did not give them 
access to an effective scheme of collective bargaining, and the then conservative Ontario 
government responded with legislation that gave agricultural workers the bare minimum 
required by the court.  This legislation is now being challenged and the court will be 
pressed to further constitutionalize collective bargaining rights.111
One particularly interesting feature of the case is that in reaching its decision the 
court relied on international law norms in its interpretation of the Canadian Charter’s 
protection of freedom of association.  For example, to defend the proposition that 
freedom of association was not just an individual right but also a collective one, 
Bastarache J, writing for the majority, stated: 
 
The collective dimension of s. 2(d) is also consistent with developments in 
international human rights law, as indicated by the jurisprudence of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations and the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association 
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(see, e.g., International Labour Office, Freedom of Association: Digest of 
decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the 
Governing Body of the ILO (4th ed. 1996)). Not only does this 
jurisprudence illustrate the range of activities that may be exercised by a 
collectivity of employees, but the International Labour Organization has 
repeatedly interpreted the right to organize as a collective right (see 
International Labour Office, Voices for Freedom of Association (Labour 
Education 1998/3, No. 112): "freedom is not only a human right; it is also, 
in the present circumstances, a collective right, a public right of 
organisation" (address delivered by Mr. Léon Jouhaux, workers' 
delegate)).112
 
Further on Bastarche J. returned to international human rights law to justify the court’s 
holding that the Charter may prevent the exclusion of vulnerable workers from 
legislation protecting the exercise of freedom of association.   
 
     The notion that underinclusion can infringe freedom of association is 
not only implied by Canadian Charter jurisprudence, but is also consistent 
with international human rights law. Article 2 of Convention (No. 87) 
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organize, 67 U.N.T.S. 17, provides that "[w]orkers and employers, 
without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and . . . to 
join organisations of their own choosing" (emphasis added), and that only 
members of the armed forces and the police may be excluded (Article 9). 
In addition, Article 10 of Convention No. 87 defines an "organisation" as 
"any organisation of workers or of employers for furthering and defending 
the interests of workers or of employers" (emphasis added). Canada 
ratified Convention No. 87 in 1972. The Convention's broadly worded 
provisions confirm precisely what I have discussed above, which is that 
discriminatory treatment implicates not only an excluded group's dignity 
interest, but also its basic freedom of association. This is further confirmed 
by the fact that Article 2 operates not only on the basis of sex, race, 
nationality and other traditional grounds of discrimination, but on the basis 
of any distinction, including occupational status (see L. Swepston, 
"Human rights law and freedom of association: Development through ILO 
supervision" (1998), 137 Int'l Lab. Rev. 169, at pp. 179-180). Nowhere is 
this clearer than in Article 1 of Convention (No. 11) concerning the Rights 
of Association and Combination of Agricultural Workers, 38 U.N.T.S. 
153, which obliges ratifying member states to secure to "all those engaged 
in agriculture" the same rights of association as to industrial workers; the 
convention makes no distinction as to the type of agricultural work 
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performed. Although provincial jurisdiction has prevented Canada from 
ratifying Convention No. 11, together these conventions provide a 
normative foundation for prohibiting any form of discrimination in the 
protection of trade union freedoms (see J. Hodges-Aeberhard, "The right 
to organise in Article 2 of Convention No. 87: What is meant by workers 
`without distinction whatsoever'?" (1989), 128 Int'l Lab. Rev. 177). This 
foundation is fortified by Convention (No. 141) concerning Organisations 
of Rural Workers and Their Role in Economic and Social Development 
(I.L.O. Official Bulletin, vol. LVIII, 1975, Series A, No. 1, p. 28) which 
extends, under Article 2, the freedom to organize to "any person engaged 
in agriculture, handicrafts or a related occupation in a rural area, whether 
as a wage earner or, . . . as a tenant, sharecropper or small owner-
occupier".113
 
This decision illustrates that, not withstanding its weak enforceability, ‘soft’ international 
law may influence the development of ‘hard’ domestic constitutional law.  Of course, 
whether this occurs depends entirely on the predilections of domestic institutions.114  
The Supreme Court also recently considered the legality of secondary picketing 
under common law, a dimension of labor law that we have not addressed up to now.  
Historically, courts had developed numerous torts to restrict picketing activity and were 
particularly hostile to secondary action.  Indeed, in the early 1960s the Ontario Court of 
Appeal famously found that secondary picketing was per se tortious.115  Since 1982 
unions had challenged a number of restrictions on picketing, claiming that they violated 
freedom of expression, but they ran into two major problems.  First, in most Canadian 
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jurisdictions picketing is governed by common law, not statute, and this raised the 
question of whether Charter applied to private litigation based on the common law.   The 
court answered this question in the negative, although it did allow that the common law 
should be developed in a manner that was consistent with Charter principles.116  The 
second problem was that where the Charter did apply because there was state action, 
restrictions on protected freedoms are permissible if they are demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society.  Although the Supreme Court found that picketing was a 
protected form of expression, it was not highly valued and in case after case the court 
found that restrictions on labor picketing were justified.117     
The Supreme Court abruptly reversed its course in a unanimous judgment in 
RWDSU, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd,118 in which the court 
held that secondary picketing was legal at common law unless it involves conduct that is 
independently tortious or criminal.  This was the first time that court modified the 
common law in order to make it conform to Charter values.  Moreover, in reaching its 
decision, the court expressed a far more positive view of the expressive value of 
picketing than it had in the past.  Of course, this decision still leaves in place all the 
economic torts, such as inducing breach of contract and civil conspiracy to injure, that 
provide a basis for limiting secondary activity, but it indicates some willingness by the 
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Supreme Court to use constitutional norms to expand the scope of legally permissible 
collective action.119
The third case raised a question about the constitutionality of union security 
provisions, particularly whether mandatory union membership violated freedom of 
association.  The claim hinges on a finding that freedom of association also protects 
individuals from forced association and that various forms of union security bring people 
into involuntary association.  The court has been badly split on these issues and this was 
evident in its most recent decision, R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring, which produced five 
separate judgments.120  A large majority of the court endorsed the proposition that 
freedom of association does encompass a negative right from forced association, but only 
a bare majority found that a mandatory membership provision in a Quebec statute 
governing collective bargaining in construction violated that guarantee.  In their view, 
compulsory membership in a union amounted to a form of ideological coercion, even in 
the absence of any evidence that the union coerced members to accept the views it 
espoused.  In the result, however, a bare majority of the justices upheld the law: one was 
of the view that there was no negative dimension to freedom of association; three rejected 
the claim that compulsory union membership violated the negative right; and one thought 
the violation was demonstrably justified because of the severity of the labor relations 
problems in the Quebec construction industry.  Thus, while this law survived the 
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challenge, the court’s decision provides ammunition for future challenges to union 
security clauses and the use of union dues for political activity.121   
In sum, then, law has operated, in a limited way, to constrain downward pressure 
on collective bargaining schemes.  While international law does not impose any 
enforceable limits on state action, its norms have influenced the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s interpretation of domestic constitutional law, and led the court to strike down 
the Conservative government’s legislation depriving agricultural workers of any 
protection or support for associational activities.  The court has also used Charter values 
to roll back slightly common law restrictions on secondary action.  Whether it will further 
constitutionalize the right to bargain collectively or to strike, however, remains to be 
seen. At the same time, the court has also indicated its concern to protect individuals 
against compelled associations.  
 
iii. Ideological/Civil Society 
An assessment of the extent to which Canadian governments are constrained from 
deregulating labor markets generally and weakening collective bargaining regimes in 
particular by popular beliefs and civil society activism is inherently difficult.  In part, the 
election of social democratic governments in a number of provinces speaks in a general 
way to the level of popular discontent with the social dislocations and growing inequality 
that are associated with the combination of trade liberalization and neo-liberal domestic 
politics, but our focus here is on the extra-parliamentary activities of labor and social 
movements, particularly as they relate to the collective bargaining regime.   
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At a national and provincial level, regressive labor legislation has often been met 
by large mobilizations of unions and social movements.  In Ontario, for example, the 
labor movement launched a series of one-day municipal-wide general strikes in response 
to the Conservative government’s labor law reforms.  Social movements joined the cause, 
bringing in their concerns about other government policies, producing unprecedented 
displays of solidarity.  In Toronto, nearly a million people took to the streets.  Yet the 
movement fizzled, in part because of internal tensions between public and private sector 
unions.122  In subsequent years two massive public sector strikes, one a legal strike by 
provincial government employees, the other an illegal province-wide strike by Ontario 
teachers opposed to legislation that, inter alia, weakened their collective bargaining 
rights, also attracted widespread public support, but did little to deter the government 
from pursuing its agenda, although it may have moderated the use of legal coercion 
against the strikers.123   
Trade liberalization and the growing economic integration of Canada, the United 
States, and Mexico has encouraged the development of transnational union and social 
movement activism.  For example, it has been suggested that the greatest contribution of 
the NAALC complaint process is not the case results, but the deepening of ties between 
national labor movements.124  Yet despite the growth of this activism, it would be 
difficult to argue that it has exercised a constraining force on the Canadian state.  In large 
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measure, this is because activists have not targeted Canada.  Rather, transnational 
activism has aimed at labor market regulation and enforcement in Mexico and other less 
developed countries, the labor practices of multinational corporations and their 
contractors, and developments in the laws and institutions governing international trade.  
To the extent that cross-border resistance is successful, this relieves some of the pressures 




The trajectory of Canadian labor law has not been as even-keeled as the new 
consensus supporters have argued.  While it is true that private sector labor laws have 
ebbed and flowed over the past fifteen years, depending on the party in power, it is 
arguable that the negative effects of certification procedure changes have outweighed the 
positive effects of more union-friendly amendments.  This is reflected in the decline in 
union density during the free-trade era.   The inclusion of public sector collective 
bargaining legislation shifts the trajectory of labor law change in a sharply downward 
direction, as governments across Canada have unilaterally acted to curb collective 
bargaining by public and para-public sector employees.  The picture becomes even 
bleaker if we expand our focus to the effectiveness of labor market regulation, taking into 
account passive deregulation.  The Canadian labor market has changed substantially over 
the past fifteen years, changes accelerated by trade liberalization.  Collective bargaining 
legislation has not responded to the challenges posed by work restructuring, even when 




Yet, it is also the case that the downward trajectory of collective bargaining law 
has not been as steep as many free-trade critics predicted.  This is because of internal 
accommodations and external restraints.  Internal accommodation is built into free 
collective bargaining, which is designed to be responsive to changes in bargaining power.  
The maco-level role of collective bargaining as promoter of industrial democracy has 
largely yielded to its more limited bargaining role, but in a context in which union 
bargaining power has been eroded.  As a result, unionized employers have been able to 
implement flexibilization and cost-cutting strategies, albeit not without resistance.  For 
those who view collective bargaining as a mechanism for protecting labor standards this 
is not good news, but it does help explain why the pressure for legal deregulation may 
have been blunted.  Indeed, it is arguable that because market discipline does not operate 
as effectively on the public sector that governments have been more inclined to use 
legislation to achieve their objectives.  External influences, however, have exerted some 
moderating pressure.  In particular, there is considerable political support for parties that 
articulate an alternative to the neo-liberal vision of a world governed by market forces.  
Where left-center parties are elected, the private sector collective bargaining regime has 
been sustained and there is somewhat less frequent resort to coercive legislation in the 
public sector.  International and domestic constitutional law have exerted a weak, 
moderating effect, most clearly exhibited in the Dunmore decision imposing a positive 
obligation on the state to protect the exercise of freedom of association for vulnerable 
workers.  Finally, while there have been major civil society mobilizations to oppose trade 
liberalization, and sporadic mass demonstrations against anti-union labor legislation, its 




B.  United States 
  
1.  Trajectory of Labor Market Regulation 
 
 a.  Legislative Change 
 
 i.  Private Sector 
 
 The most notable characteristic of American private collective bargaining 
legislation is that it has not changed in any major respect since at least 1959 and that its 
basic text dates from 1935 and 1947.125  Legislative inaction is not the result of a lack of 
effort, largely on the part of unions, to amend the law.  Rather, it is primarily caused by 
organized employers mobilizing enough support in Congress to block any amendment 
proposed by labor.  Clearly, employer opposition to union-sponsored labor law reform 
predates NAFTA, so it cannot be said that legislative inertia is one of NAFTA’s effects, 
although it is fair to surmise that in the post-NAFTA environment employers’ resolve to 
resist labor law reforms, such as a prohibition on the permanent replacement of striking 
workers, has only been strengthened.126  Therefore, an assessment of NAFTA’s impact 
on the effectiveness of private sector collective bargaining must shift to passive and 
administrative forms of deregulation. 
  
 ii. Public Sector Collective Bargaining 
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 Jurisdictional arrangements over public sector bargaining in the U.S. are 
extremely decentralized.  As a result, collective bargaining rights are “a crazy-quilt 
patchwork of state and local laws, regulations, executive orders, court decisions, and 
attorney general opinions.”127  Like in Canada, public sector collective bargaining laws 
were first passed in the 1960s and were adapted from the private sector model, subject to 
a variety of limitations regarding the scope of bargaining and dispute resolution.  
Unionization in the public sector spread rapidly and union density rose sharply as private 
sector density fell. 
 Because of its decentralized character, public sector labor law is much more 
responsive to changes in the political orientation of the government in power.  As a 
result, changes in public sector labor law have been diverse, making it difficult to identify 
an overall trend.  Belman et al, argue that public sector collective bargaining has moved 
from a period of maturation to one of transition, and that its future direction will be 
shaped by two competing strategies, one involving a best practices approach, the other 
cost-cutting and downsizing.128  In the former scenario, public sector collective 
bargaining may fare well, while in the later it is likely to be restrained. 
 Federal government labor law provides a good example of how shifting political 
fortunes influence the direction of change.  The Clinton administration issued Executive 
Order 12871 in 1993.  It aimed to improve government efficiency through partnership 
arrangements with its unionized employees.  Under this regime, union membership and 
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density increased in the federal public service.  The Bush administration was opposed to 
working with unions and repealed EO 12871.  As well, his administration sought and 
gained the power to exclude unions from agencies handling public security issues.  As a 
result, in recent years federal sector union density has been declining.129   
 At the state level, the picture is quite mixed.  As of 2002 there were 27 states that 
did not have public sector collective bargaining laws, although provision existed in some 
of those states for collective bargaining under local ordinances or executive orders.  This 
is largely unchanged from the situation in 1987.130  Collective bargaining rights were 
extended to public sector workers in a number of states by executive order (eg. Maryland 
and Kentucky), but in at least one state, Indiana, the public sector collective bargaining 
scheme was terminated by executive order.131  Belman et al. conclude that “the 
pronounced trend since 1987 has been toward circumscription of bargaining and toward 
support for unilateral action by government”132 but it would appear that the retrenchment 
in the US is not as severe as it has been in Canada.   
 
 b.  Passive and Administrative Deregulation 
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 The real story of private sector American labor law is not that it has been stripped 
down by legislative change (at least not since 1959), but rather that it has been rendered 
ineffective in promoting collective bargaining or even in protecting basic worker rights to 
freedom of association.  The process of erosion, however, was already well advanced 
long before NAFTA.  Private sector union density hovered around the 30 percent range 
until about 1970, when it began dropping sharply.  Thus, when Paul Weiler published his 
well-known piece documenting the failings of the Wagner Act in 1983, he was looking 
back over a decade in which private sector density had dropped to about 20 percent in 
1980.  Private sector union density has continued to decline and since the beginning of 
the free trade era it has shrunk another 25 percent, falling below 9 percent in in 2002.133
 There is a great debate over the causes of this decline and whether and to what 
extent it is attributable to the deficiencies of collective bargaining law and its 
administration, particularly in the face of growing employer resistance to unionization.  It 
is beyond the scope of this article to review that literature, but there seems to be fairly 
compelling evidence that law does matter and that its failings explain some significant 
part of in the decline of private sector unions.134  In particular, the US system of drawn-
out certification elections and the lack of adequate protection against unfair labor 
practices have been noted as major impediments to successful organizing drives in the 
face of employer hostility, while the grant of legal authority to employers to hire 
permanent strike replacements and the restriction on unions from engaging in secondary 
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action have been identified as major causes of weakened union bargaining power.135  
These shortcomings are, in part, embedded in statute’s text, but they are also the product 
of decades of administrative and judicial decision-making.136  Thus, in the U.S. context, 
it is perhaps artificial to distinguish between passive and administrative deregulation.   
 This is not to say that the NLRB and the courts are relentlessly anti-union in their 
decision-making.  The NLRB has become far more politicized than Canadian labor 
relations boards and thus there are much greater shifts in decision-making when a new 
administration takes office.137  For example, the current Bush board has been accused of 
exhibiting a strong employer bias in recent decisions that have, inter alia, overruled 
Clinton board decisions that facilitated bargaining by graduate teaching assistants and 
contingent workers.138  Courts, too, have shifted over time in their review of NLRB 
decision-making, but for many years they have tended to give priority to individual rights 
over the promotion and preservation of collective bargaining relationships.139  The 
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general picture that emerges is one of a regime that has become sclerotic through a 
combination of statutory gridlock, the weight of past decisions, and judicial 
constraints.140
 If American labor law was already ineffective at the beginning of the free-trade 
era, changes in the labor market since then have only exacerbated the problem.  Much of 
the success of the US labor movement was premised on its ability to take wages out of 
competition by, in effect, organizing entire industries.  As free trade agreements unleash 
competitive forces, and governments deregulate sectors of the economy like inter-state 
trucking and airlines, unions can no longer sustain that position, with the result that 
unionized employers often find themselves at a competitive disadvantage.141  The result, 
as Stone notes, is that “As firms find themselves in a more competitive environment 
through increased trade and global competition, they have to pay more attention to short-
term cost reduction.”142   For non-union firms, union avoidance looms as an even higher 
priority than it did previously.  According to a study of union certification campaigns in 
1998 and 1999, more than half the targeted employers threatened to move or shut-down 
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operations in response to union activity.143  Growing competitive pressure has also 
promoted reliance on flexibilization strategies, including outsourcing and the growth of 
contingent and precarious employment,144 all of which undermine the effectiveness of 
collective bargaining law which was constructed on the norm of the standard employment 
relation that offered workers long-term, reasonably secure employment with a large 
employer.  The new labor market places enormous demands on unions to continuously 
organize new and small bargaining units, often populated by contingent and precarious 
workers whose employment status may be uncertain, and to negotiate collective 
agreements with small firms operating in highly competitive environments.145  Thus, 
while a number of scholars have found that trade liberalization is not a major direct cause 
of deunionization, they have argued that its indirect effects are significant.146  
 In short, it is hardly a cause for celebration to say that the rights of U.S. workers 
under its private sector collective bargaining laws have not been eroded by legislative 
change during the free-trade era.  The effectiveness of U.S. labor law was already close to 
the proverbial bottom prior to the free-trade era, so it is not surprising that employers 
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have not pursued labor law reform as a means of adjustment to the pressures of 
globalization.  Rather, their lobbying energies have been directed at blocking union-
sponsored labor law reforms that would respond to the well-documented inability of the 
scheme to promote collective bargaining and protect freedom of association in today’s 
labor market.  The growing mismatch between the legal regime and the world of work 
that it is intended to regulate justifies characterizing what has happened as a case of 
passive and administrative deregulation par excellence.      
 
 2.  Contextual Mediations 
 
 a.  Bargaining 
 
 While it has been argued that the Wagner Act was conceived as an ambitious 
attempt to construct a more democratic and cooperative workplace, there is little dispute 
that, at best, American collective bargaining has become a vehicle through which unions 
and employers negotiate work rules, wages, and benefits.  This occurred well before the 
free trade era, so our focus here will be on collective bargaining outcomes.147  
 As in Canada, a number of indicators suggest that employers have used the 
collective bargaining process to extract concessions.  Recent data indicate that although 
unionized workers still make more than their non-union counterparts, the wage 
differential has narrowed.  During the period from 1991 to 2000 the wages of non-union 
                                                 
147  Mark Barenbergy, “The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and 
Workplace Cooperation,” (1993) 106 Harvard Law Review 1379 (arguing Senator Wagner sought 
to construct a cooperative social democracy); Katherine Stone, “The Post-War Paradigm in 
American Labor Law, “ (1981) 90 Yale Law Journal 1509 (arguing that Act treated a bare legal 
framework to facilitate private ordering by management and labor); Karl E. Klare, “Judicial 
Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness,” (1977-78) 
62 Minnesota Law Review 265 (Act’s transformative potential defeated). 
 71
 
workers increased faster than those of unionized workers.148  The linkage between 
productivity gains and union wage increases has been broken as capital is extracting a 
larger share of productivity growth.149  Work stoppages are becoming less frequent.  For 
example, in 1989 there were 51 strikes idling 1,000 or more workers, but only 15 in 
2004.150  These data suggest that employers are taking economic advantage of unions’ 
declining bargaining power.  
 We also need to consider the extent to which collective bargaining has 
accommodated work restructuring within unionized firms.  According to one survey, in 
1999 new work flexibility arrangements were achieved in one-third to one-half of 
negotiations, while new job security provisions were made in one-tenth to one-quarter of 
collective agreements.  Even more troubling was that less than ten percent of respondents 
reported that they had somewhat or very cooperative relations and that their relationship 
was improving.151  The picture that emerges from this study is that while innovative 
contract language is being negotiated, this is often the result of management forcing its 
agenda onto the union without providing workers with the job security or wage increases 
that they seek.  The result is adjustment, but of an imbalanced, not a progressive, kind; 
the product of changing power relations more than the negotiation of mutual gains along 
the high road.   
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 b.  External Constraints 
  
 i.  Political Constraints 
 
 Unlike in Canada, where governments have regularly modified collective 
bargaining legislation to make it better accord with its political orientation, in the U.S. 
private sector collective bargaining law has been frozen.  Deregulation of collective 
bargaining has not occurred through direct legislative action, but rather has been passive 
and administrative.  The political problem, therefore, has not been to block legislative 
deregulation, but to reverse the downward trajectory of the regime through remedial 
legislation.  This has been beyond the means of the American labor movement.   
 In part, this is because the federal government must amend private sector 
collective bargaining.  This deprives the union movement of the opportunity to have 
changes made in those states where it has greater influence.  As well, social-democratic 
parties have no presence on the American political scene and the labor movement has 
traditionally channeled its political energies into support for the Democratic Party.  Yet 
even during Democratic administrations, the labor movement has been unable to get any 
part of its collective bargaining reform agenda passed.  The strength of employer 
resistance to unionization in their own firms is carried over into the political arena, where 
employers are firmly united in their opposition to any law reform that might make the 
collective bargaining regime more effective.  In these circumstances, there is little 
prospect that in the foreseeable future a weakened labor movement will be able to 
mobilize the political resources necessary to get any part of its reform agenda enacted 
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into law.152  In sum, electoral politics have not acted as a brake on the deterioration of the 
U.S. private sector collective bargaining regime.  
 
 ii.  Legal 
 
 International law has had even less influence in the United States than in Canada.  
Although the United States has not ratified either of the ILO’s core conventions 
respecting freedom of association (Conventions 87 and 98), it supported the ILO 
Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which includes freedom of 
association.  As well, member countries are bound to respect the principles of 
conventions 87 and 98 even if they have not ratified them. and the United States has 
accepted the jurisdiction of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) to 
review complaints filed against it, even though it is not subject to the fuller review 
process that applies to countries that have ratified these conventions.   
 While the U.S. accepts these international rights in principle, it feels free to depart 
from them in practice.  In 1990 the CFA upheld two complaints against the U.S., one 
challenging the right of employers to hire permanent replacements for striking workers 
and the other challenging state laws prohibiting public sector unionization and collective 
bargaining.  The government took no action to bring its laws into compliance with ILO 
standards.  Since then US trade unionists have not brought any further complaints.153   
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 The NAALC has also had little impact on American labor law.  To date, eight 
complaints have been filed against the U.S., seven with the Mexican NAO and one with 
the Canadian.  Six of these related to freedom of association.  The first was launched in 
1995 and involved the closure of a Sprint plant, allegedly to avoid unionization.  
Ministerial consultations produced an agreement to keep the Mexican Secretary of Labor 
informed of the legal proceedings underway in the United States, to instruct the NAALC 
secretariat to study the effects of sudden plant closures on freedom of association, and to 
hold a public forum in San Francisco, the site of the closure.  In December 1996 the 
NLRB ruled that the plant closing was motivated by anti-union animus, but the United 
States Court of Appeal overturned decision in November 1997.  The NAALC 
secretariat’s report, issued in April 1997, found that threats of plant closing to resist union 
organizing efforts were widespread in the United States but less prevalent in Canada and 
Mexico.154    
 Four complaints were filed in 1998, three of which raised freedom of association 
issues.155  All three were resolved by the signing of a ministerial agreement that included 
an undertaking to hold a government-to-government meeting to discuss the application of 
US law in the areas raised by the submission.  As well, public outreach and education 
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sessions were organized in two of the localities where the alleged violations occurred to 
inform the public of the workers’ legal rights.  In 1999 the Canadian NAO declined to 
accept a submission alleging violations of the NLRA and in 2003 the Mexican NAO 
accepted a submission alleging violations of numerous workers’ rights, including 
freedom of association.156  
 The results of the complaints process have been disappointing, to say the least.  
As one commentator noted, “up to now all cases have ended with ministerial 
consultations and the joint agreement of action programmes that have not produced 
visible changes in the legal practices of the countries concerned.”157  In part this is a 
function of the NAALC’s design, since complaints about freedom of association, 
collective bargaining and the right to strike cannot go past the first stage of ministerial 
consultations.  The result is that disputes are resolved at the political level in a context in 
which no government has an interest in pursuing high intensity conflict strategies.158  Not 
surprisingly, activists are losing interest in using the NAALC and few new submissions 
are being filed. 
 This still leaves open the possibility that international labor and human rights 
norms exert an indirect influence through domestic constitutional and common law, as 
we saw in Canada.  This has not been the case in the US.  The US constitution does not 
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protect freedom of association as such, and so attempts to ground labor rights in the 
constitution have had to point to other protected rights.  None of these avenues have 
provided a basis for constitutionalizing labor rights.  Indeed, opponents of collective 
labor rights have had more success invoking constitutional protection for the right of 
individuals to refrain from compelled association.159  As well, international labor and 
human rights norms have not influenced the courts’ constitutional interpretations in this 
area, or in others160 and there is also no indication that US courts are likely to exercise 
their powers of statutory interpretation or develop the common law in ways that would 
better protect workers’ freedom of association.  In sum, neither international nor domestic 
law has operated as an external constraint on the decline of the collective bargaining 
regime. 
 
 iii.  Civil Society Restraints 
 
 As noted in our discussion of Canada, it is inherently difficult to assess the extent 
to which governments are constrained by popular beliefs and social movement activism.  
On the domestic front, the labor movement, in coalition with other social movements, has 
scored some successes in their opposition to the free-trade agenda.  It vigorously opposed 
NAFTA, and was largely responsible for creating a political environment in which then-
candidate Clinton felt constrained to make his support for NAFTA conditional on the 
negotiation of a side accord protecting labor and the environment.  As well, in the fall of 
1997 and in 1998, the labor movement successfully lobbied to block the grant of fast-
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track trade negotiation authority to Clinton.161  The labor movement also played a key 
role in organizing the protests at the WTO meetings in Seattle that led Clinton to float the 
idea of linking trade to labor rights.  Those successes, however, were short-lived.  In 
2000 the House approved a trade deal with China and in 2002 President Bush was 
granted fast-track authority, albeit with a provision that allows labor and environmental 
issues to be addressed in the agreement.  This has taken the form of NAALC-type 
provisions that express a principled commitment of the parties to core labor standards, 
but only requires each party to enforce its existing laws while excusing weaknesses due 
to reasonable exercises of discretionary power and bona fide decisions regarding the 
allocation of resources.162
 While these efforts aim to protect American labor from ‘unfair’ competition, they 
do so in a way that is oriented toward addressing poor conditions outside of the country.  
They do not address directly the declining efficacy of the US labor law regime.  In large 
part, this is because the labor movement recognizes that labor law reform is not 
achievable under current conditions. Therefore, it has set about trying to rebuild itself 
organizationally, often through the use of tactics that by-pass the NLRA framework.  
This brand of social movement unionism has produced some notable successes, but has 
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yet to reverse the decline in private sector unionism.163  Absent such revitalization, there 
is little prospect that unions acting in concert with other social movements will be able 
effectively to constrain the pressures undermining the efficacy of American labor law. 
 Transnational activism, as we noted in our discussion of Canada, has developed, 
in part stimulated by the NAALC complaints mechanism, which encourages transnational 
collaboration.  The U.S.-Mexican border has been the site of much of this activity.164  Its 
primary focus, however, has been on Mexican labor practices, or, if we go beyond the 
NAFTA framework, labor practices in the undeveloped world, rather than in the US.  
This is not intended as a criticism, but merely as an observation in support of a simple 
point: transnational civil society activism exerts no pressure on the US government to 
staunch the erosion of its collective bargaining regime.   
 
 3.  Conclusion 
 
 An assessment of the trajectory of US collective bargaining law must start from 
the fact of its weakened state at the beginning of the free-trade era.  It might be said that 
because it started closer to the bottom, it would not be as strongly affected by regulatory 
competition as Canada, the jurisdiction with higher labor standards.  There is indeed an 
element of truth to this; US employers have not made any significant effort to amend the 
NLRA in the free-trade era.  However, the lack of legislative change does not establish 
that the collective bargaining regime’s efficacy is unaffected by globalization.  While 
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U.S. collective bargaining law has not been racing downwards, increased global 
competitiveness has changed the labor market in ways that are antithetical to its ability to 
promote collective bargaining and protect workers’ freedom of association.  The growing 
mismatch between law and the social reality in which it operates produces greater 
regulatory failure.  Public sector collective bargaining has also been adversely affected by 
the adoption of neo-liberal policies that are associated with the competitiveness agenda, 
but retrenchment does not seem to be as severe in the U.S. as it has been in Canada. 
 The impact of liberalized trade on collective bargaining law, however, is mediated 
by internal and external factors.  Internally, the collective bargaining process has 
accommodated employer-initiated demands for concessions and greater flexibility, 
although it would take further study would to determine whether Canadian unions have 
been more successful at protecting their members than their U.S. counterparts.  
Externally, political constraints have operated to prevent enactment of the remedial 
legislation required to slow or reverse its erosion through what can best be characterized 
as malign neglect.  As well, international law has little or no influence on the direction of 
U.S. labor law, and there seems little prospect that courts will constitutionalize labor 
rights or otherwise protect them through their power to interpret statutes and develop the 
common law.  Finally, civil society activism in the labor rights area is largely directed 
outwards, rather than inwards on domestic labor policy. 
 
IV.  Conclusion: Have Great Expectations Been Defeated? 
 
 If the great expectation was that NAFTA would produce dramatic and significant 
legislative erosion of collective bargaining laws, then it is fair to say that that expectation 
has been partially defeated.  In the U.S. the NLRA has not been amended during the free-
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trade era, and, to the extent that it is possible to discern a trend, public sector collective 
bargaining law has suffered relatively modest setbacks.  The expectation of erosion was 
stronger for Canada, the jurisdiction with the higher labor standards, and while there has 
not been a race to the bottom in labor legislation, there has been deterioration.  While 
private sector collective bargaining laws have been both strengthened and weakened at 
different times and in different places, the most significant trend has been the elimination 
of card-check certifications in a many jurisdictions, including Ontario and British 
Columbia.  As numerous studies have shown, this change is likely to have a significant 
and negative impact on trade union density.  Moreover, if we expand our focus to include 
public sector collective bargaining, we find the level of legislative erosion even greater as 
the frequency with which Canadian governments override or reduce existing collective 
bargaining rights has increased in the past decade.   
 The extent of defeated expectations is even less if we shift our focus from 
legislation to regulatory effectiveness.  U.S. collective bargaining law was notoriously 
ineffective going into the free-trade era and has only become more so as trade-linked 
changes to the labor market have created an environment that is even more inimical to the 
creation and perpetuation of collective bargaining relationships.  A similar situation 
prevails in Canada, although it is moderated somewhat by stronger and better-enforced 
labor rights.   
 This partial vindication of the predictions of Model 1 still leaves us with the need 
to explain why great expectations were partially defeated.  The contextual variables 
introduced by Model 2 led us to examine factors internal to the system of collective 
bargaining and ones external to it.  Collective bargaining is itself a mechanism of 
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adjustment that accommodates changing goals and objectives that are either in the mutual 
interest of the parties or are backed by one party’s superior bargaining power.  In both 
Canada and the United States there is evidence that both these kinds of accommodation 
are occurring, largely in response to employer initiatives aimed at cutting labor costs and 
increasing productivity.  While in some cases this results in labor-management 
cooperation and mutual gains, the evidence suggests that the more frequent from of 
accommodation involves labor concessions to management demands.  While some might 
characterize this outcome as a regulatory failure, I have treated it as accommodation 
within the system on the ground that private sector collective bargaining regimes in both 
countries were intended to be responsive to changing economic and labor market 
conditions.   
 Differences between Canada and the United States are, perhaps, most marked in 
relation to the influence of external factors.  Because labor law in Canada is provincial 
rather than national, it has been more sensitive to local swings in political strength and 
hence labor law reform has been more volatile.  Conservative governments have taken 
steps to ‘Americanize’ labor laws, particularly in the important area of certification 
procedures, but NDP and most Liberal governments (BC is an exception) have resisted 
that pressure and, indeed, have often passed legislation that moderately strengthens the 
private sector collective bargaining regime.  They have been less charitable when it 
comes to their own workers.  In the US, there is little prospect that in the foreseeable 
future labor will be able to muster political support for long-needed reforms.   
 International or transnational legal regimes are ineffective in directly countering 
downward pressure on collective bargaining law in both Canada and the U.S.  However, 
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the Supreme Court of Canada has chosen to take international law seriously and use it as 
a point of reference in its interpretation of Canadian constitutional law.  Depending on 
how far they go, this approach could lead to a constitutionalization of some parts of the 
collective bargaining regime, possibly including the right to have effective access to a 
statutory bargain collectively scheme.  As well, the court has recently identified trade 
unions as socially desirable institutions whose activities, like picketing, are worthy of 
constitutional protection.  There is little prospect that American courts will protect labor 
rights to the same extent. 
 Finally, social movements in both countries have been active in opposing 
globalization and neo-liberal restructuring, although it is arguably the case that protest 
actions aimed at regressive private sector labor law reforms and interference with public 
sector workers’ collective bargaining rights have been stronger in Canada than in the U.S.  
Yet, social movement mobilizations or their threat do not seem to have had much effect 
on domestic collective bargaining policy.  Social movements, however, have scored some 
success in getting social and labor issues onto the table in international trade talks and in 
pressuring transnational corporations to take some steps monitor labor conditions in their 
overseas supply networks.      
 In sum, this study supports the view that free-trade agreements create 
conditioning frameworks that generate downward economic and institutional pressures 
on the effectiveness of collective bargaining laws.  These pressures will also operate in 
the collective bargaining process itself, often yielding poorer outcomes for unionized 
workers.  More optimistically, our study shows there are avenues for resistance, 
notwithstanding the attempt through free trade agreements to impose on politics, law and 
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social movements the discipline of market forces.  In Canada, law , at least temporarily, 
has proven to be more resistant to those disciplinary forces than many would have 
anticipated, but it would be a dangerous strategy to rely exclusively on the vagaries of 
judicial decision-making to resist the growing commodification of labor.  The task of 
successfully organizing political and social movement resistance, however, is a daunting 
one.   
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